Stackwright Pro — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@stackwright-pro/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@stackwright-pro/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@stackwright-pro/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:868`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "quire(\"fs\"); var import_child_process = require(\"child_process\"); var import_path2 = __toESM(require(\"path\")); var BASEL",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 868,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.mjs:844`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.mjs"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import path2 from \"path\"; var BASELINE_DEPS = { \"@stackwright-pro/mcp\": \"lates",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/server.mjs",
"line": 844,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:8776`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "} const bs = await import(bsPath); if (typeof bs[fn] !== \"function\") { return { ok: false, error: `${fn}",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 8776,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.mjs:8777`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.mjs"
},
"evidence": "} const bs = await import(bsPath); if (typeof bs[fn] !== \"function\") { return { ok: false, error: `${fn}",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/server.mjs",
"line": 8777,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@stackwright-pro/mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@stackwright-pro/mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
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"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_list_entities",
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},
{
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"reasons": {}
},
{
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"reasons": {}
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{
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"reasons": {}
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{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_list_approved_specs",
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_configure_isr",
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"reasons": {}
},
{
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"reasons": {}
},
{
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{
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{
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{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_detect_conflict",
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_write_workflow_container_page",
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{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_check_contrast",
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_compile_site",
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_compile_page",
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_strip_legacy_integrations",
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_emit_env_local",
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_emit_mock_ports",
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_list_specs",
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "stackwright_pro_consolidate_integrations",
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{
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}
],
"surfaceDigest": "5a9af28774a2666fef21befb4fd7a8d84cb7f26f190607135201fe2a9346ea84",
"stats": {
"tools": 62,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}