Stackwright Pro MCP Server
@stackwright-pro/mcp
npm
v0.2.0-alpha.130
Published by @stackwright-pro — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP tools for Stackwright Pro - Data Explorer, Security, ISR, and Dashboard generation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:868`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: quire("fs"); var import_child_process = require("child_process"); var import_path2 = __toESM(require("path")); var BASEL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.mjs:844`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import path2 from "path"; var BASELINE_DEPS = { "@stackwright-pro/mcp": "lates
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.mjs
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:8776`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } const bs = await import(bsPath); if (typeof bs[fn] !== "function") { return { ok: false, error: `${fn}
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/server.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.mjs:8777`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } const bs = await import(bsPath); if (typeof bs[fn] !== "function") { return { ok: false, error: `${fn}
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.mjs
Tools 62
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
stackwright_pro_add_approved_specno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_build_specialist_promptno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_check_contrastno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_check_execution_readyno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_clarifyno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_cleanup_scaffoldno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_allno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_authno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_collectionsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_integrationsno sensitive capability
Show 52 more tools ↓
stackwright_pro_compile_pageno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_pagesno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_siteno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_compile_themeno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_configure_authno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_configure_isrno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_configure_isr_batchno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_consolidate_integrationsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_derive_accessible_paletteno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_describe_endpointno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_detect_conflictno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_emit_env_localno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_emit_eventno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_emit_mock_portsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_emit_providers_fileno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_generate_dashboardno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_generate_detail_pageno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_generate_filterno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_get_next_questionno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_get_otter_nameno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_get_pipeline_stateno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_get_ready_phasesno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_get_schemano sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_get_type_schemasno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_list_approved_specsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_list_artifactsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_list_collectionsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_list_entitiesno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_list_specsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_parse_otter_responseno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_present_phase_questionsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_read_auth_manifestsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_read_phase_answersno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_reconcile_page_auth_blocksno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_record_answerno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_resolve_data_strategyno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_safe_writeno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_save_build_contextno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_save_manifestno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_save_phase_answersno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_set_pipeline_stateno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_setup_packagesno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_strip_legacy_integrationsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_validate_artifactno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_validate_specno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_validate_workflowno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_validate_yaml_fragmentno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_verify_artifact_signaturesno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_verify_otter_integrityno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_write_pageno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_write_phase_questionsno sensitive capabilitystackwright_pro_write_workflow_container_pageno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0-alpha.130 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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