@sshanzel/plex
npm
v0.10.0
Published by @sshanzel — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first, open-source AI code reviewer: an MCP server + CLI that grounds any agent's review in a blast-radius code graph and accumulated review knowledge.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-PMWUFBH4.js:407`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; function isLinkedWorktree(repoPath) { try { const g = path4.join(repoPath,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-PMWUFBH4.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/plex.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import path2 from "path"; // packages/cli/src/parse.ts function parse(argv) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/plex.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_pitfallsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_scanno sensitive capabilityconsolidate_knowledgeno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityget_blast_radiusno sensitive capabilityget_deterministic_findingsno sensitive capabilityget_relevant_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityget_review_contextno sensitive capabilityindex_repono sensitive capabilityreconcile_outcomesno sensitive capabilityrecord_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrefresh_outcomesno sensitive capabilitysubmit_findingsno sensitive capabilitysweep_outcomesno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.10.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.5 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @sshanzel/plex --online
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