Plex (vladimir-tutin) MCP Server
plex-mcp-server
PyPI
v1.1.7
Published by vladimir-tutin — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Plex Media Server - Control your Plex server via Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible client
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (watcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`watcher.py:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self.process = subprocess.Popen( command, cwd=SERVER_PATH, cr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server watcher.py
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
media_get_detailsingests untrusted inputsessions_get_media_playback_historyingests untrusted inputclient_control_playbackno sensitive capabilityclient_get_detailsno sensitive capabilityclient_get_timelinesno sensitive capabilityclient_listno sensitive capabilityclient_navigateno sensitive capabilityclient_set_streamsno sensitive capabilityclient_start_playbackno sensitive capabilitycollection_add_tono sensitive capability
Show 45 more tools ↓
collection_createno sensitive capabilitycollection_deleteno sensitive capabilitycollection_editno sensitive capabilitycollection_listno sensitive capabilitycollection_remove_fromno sensitive capabilitylibrary_get_contentsno sensitive capabilitylibrary_get_detailsno sensitive capabilitylibrary_get_recently_addedno sensitive capabilitylibrary_get_statsno sensitive capabilitylibrary_listno sensitive capabilitylibrary_refreshno sensitive capabilitylibrary_scanno sensitive capabilitymedia_deleteno sensitive capabilitymedia_edit_metadatano sensitive capabilitymedia_get_artworkno sensitive capabilitymedia_list_available_artworkno sensitive capabilitymedia_searchno sensitive capabilitymedia_set_artworkno sensitive capabilityplaylist_add_tono sensitive capabilityplaylist_copy_to_userno sensitive capabilityplaylist_createno sensitive capabilityplaylist_deleteno sensitive capabilityplaylist_editno sensitive capabilityplaylist_get_contentsno sensitive capabilityplaylist_listno sensitive capabilityplaylist_remove_fromno sensitive capabilityplaylist_upload_posterno sensitive capabilityserver_clean_bundlesno sensitive capabilityserver_empty_trashno sensitive capabilityserver_get_alertsno sensitive capabilityserver_get_bandwidthno sensitive capabilityserver_get_butler_tasksno sensitive capabilityserver_get_current_resourcesno sensitive capabilityserver_get_infono sensitive capabilityserver_get_plex_logsno sensitive capabilityserver_optimize_databaseno sensitive capabilityserver_run_butler_taskno sensitive capabilitysessions_get_activeno sensitive capabilityuser_get_continue_watchingno sensitive capabilityuser_get_infono sensitive capabilityuser_get_on_deckno sensitive capabilityuser_get_statisticsno sensitive capabilityuser_get_watch_historyno sensitive capabilityuser_list_all_usersno sensitive capabilityuser_search_usersno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan plex-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Plex 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
Unified MCP server for Plex, Sonarr, Radarr, and Trakt — 45 AI tools for managing your media library with personalized recommendations (54 with write operations enabled)
A MCP server to allow LLM's to interact with your plex server
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that enables Claude to query and manage Plex media libraries.
MCP server for Plex media discovery, search, and library management
Local-first, open-source AI code reviewer: an MCP server + CLI that grounds any agent's review in a blast-radius code graph and accumulated review knowledge.
More in Other
A Model Context Protocol server implementation for AdGuard Home that enables AI agents to query and manage DNS records, filtering rules and more
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
MCP server with Airtable integration
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.
Access SEC filings efficiently, save time and tokens, and get cited answers.
A smart [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server for [AniList](https://anilist.co) that gets your anime/manga taste - not just API calls.