Squish Memory MCP Server
squish-memory
npm
v1.9.0
Published by michielhdoteth — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI memory system for coding agents. Local-first MCP runtime with connectors (Google Drive, GitHub, Slack, Notion), knowledge graphs, decay scoring, and multi-tier deployment. Free locally, paid Cloud for sync and teams.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/dependency-manager.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/dependency-manager.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import os from "node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/dependency-manager.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/installer-core.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/installer-core.mjs:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { CLIENT_MCP_TARGETS, } from './install-config.mjs'; // -------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/installer-core.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/runtime-launcher.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/runtime-launcher.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; function normalizePath(value) { return value.replace(/\\/g, '/'); } /*
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/runtime-launcher.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/squish-mcp.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/squish-mcp.mjs:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { attachChildLogging, getDefaultLogFile, resolveRuntimeLaunch } from './
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/squish-mcp.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/squish.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/squish.mjs:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); const rootDir = join(__dirname, '..'); const args = process.argv.slice(2);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/squish.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (core/embeddings/qmd-client.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`core/embeddings/qmd-client.ts:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { logger } from '../logger'; export interface QMDSearchOptions { q
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/embeddings/qmd-client.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (core/runtime/install-diagnostics.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`core/runtime/install-diagnostics.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; export interface BinaryResolution { command: string; paths: string[];
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/runtime/install-diagnostics.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/commands/run.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/commands/run.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { join } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirna
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/cli/dist/commands/run.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/cli/dist/src/commands/run.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/cli/dist/src/commands/run.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { join } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirna
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/cli/dist/src/commands/run.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (plugin/openclaw/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`plugin/openclaw/index.ts:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugin/openclaw/index.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (core/embeddings/google-multimodal.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`core/embeddings/google-multimodal.ts:137`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t tokenResponse = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server core/embeddings/google-multimodal.ts
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (plugin/opencode/__tests__/plugin.test.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`plugin/opencode/__tests__/plugin.test.ts:45`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = (await import(builtPath)) as { default: { id: string; server: unknown } }; expect(mod.default).toBe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server plugin/opencode/__tests__/plugin.test.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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