Spatial Memory MCP Server

spatial-memory-mcp PyPI v1.11.4

Published by arman-tech — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
F
59/100
Last scanned
Trust
F · 59/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
F Why this grade 100 − 40.6 = 59/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−38.5 Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code ×3 MTC-SRC-008 exfiltration
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Grade capped: 3 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (tests/unit/test_file_security.py)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`tests/unit/test_file_security.py:778`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: id_rsa

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server tests/unit/test_file_security.py

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (benchmarks/hook_coldstart.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `benchmarks/hook_coldstart.py:62`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server benchmarks/hook_coldstart.py

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/unit/test_hooks_post_tool_use.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/unit/test_hooks_post_tool_use.py:274`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/unit/test_hooks_post_tool_use.py

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (tests/unit/test_hooks_redaction.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `tests/unit/test_hooks_redaction.py:29`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/unit/test_hooks_redaction.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (spatial_memory/core/filesystem.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`spatial_memory/core/filesystem.py:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server spatial_memory/core/filesystem.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"spatial-memory-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package spatial-memory-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.11.4 latest F 59/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: F · 59/100
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