Ms 365 MCP Server
@softeria/ms-365-mcp-server
npm
v0.149.1
Source verified
Published by softeria — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for interacting with Microsoft 365 and Office services through the Graph API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/modules/generate-mcp-tools.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/modules/generate-mcp-tools.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; /** * Converts single-quoted `path:` strings that contain function-style OData
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/modules/generate-mcp-tools.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/token-cache-storage.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/token-cache-storage.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; import fs, { existsSync, readFileSync
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/token-cache-storage.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-calendar-fix.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-calendar-fix.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname, join } from 'path'; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-calendar-fix.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/modules/generate-mcp-tools.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/modules/generate-mcp-tools.mjs:28`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: utputDir}`); } execSync( `npx -y openapi-zod-client "${openapiTrimmedFile}" -o "${clientFilePath}" --with
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/modules/generate-mcp-tools.mjs
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
search-toolsingests untrusted inputexecute-toolno sensitive capabilityget-tool-schemano sensitive capabilitylist-accountsno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilityremove-accountno sensitive capabilityselect-accountno sensitive capabilityverify-loginno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.149.1 latest |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.148.0 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.146.2 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v0.146.1 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.145.2 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.145.1 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.145.0 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.144.0 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.143.0 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.141.0 |
B 84/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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