Slickfast — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@slickfast/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@slickfast/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@slickfast/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_started → news → push_to_trmnl. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_started → news → push_to_trmnl"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"read_chart",
"publish_page",
"news",
"get_started"
],
"sources": [
"news",
"get_started"
],
"sinks": [
"push_to_trmnl"
],
"path": [
"get_started",
"news",
"push_to_trmnl"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_started",
"to": "news",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "news",
"to": "push_to_trmnl",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5315`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.slickfast.com/live/\" + handle, { method: \"POST\", headers: { \"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 5315,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"read_chart\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_chart\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_chart",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"webhook_url\" on \"push_to_trmnl\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"push_to_trmnl\" takes a URL/host parameter \"webhook_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "push_to_trmnl",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.webhook_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "webhook_url"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"read_chart",
"publish_page",
"news",
"get_started"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"news",
"get_started"
],
"externalSink": [
"push_to_trmnl"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_started",
"news",
"push_to_trmnl"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_started → news → push_to_trmnl."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "render_chart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gallery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_palettes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_chart",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "push_to_trmnl",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "share_chart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_pagespec",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "my_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "news",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_started",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mcp_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3e450f2fba7045ba6d191eef9d21c06a169f049c0fc7c31a0d64c342539a46a6",
"stats": {
"tools": 15,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}