Slickfast MCP Server
@slickfast/mcp
npm
v0.7.30
Published by @slickfast — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
SlickFast — render 47 chart & info-design types (bar, line, pie, KPI, cards, funnel, matrix, gauge, calendar…) plus multi-chart dashboards tiled into one image, as SVG/PNG via MCP. Local and deterministic; nothing leaves your machine.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_started → news → push_to_trmnl. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_started → news → push_to_trmnl
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5315`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.slickfast.com/live/" + handle, { method: "POST", headers: { "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "read_chart"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "read_chart" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool read_chart · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "push_to_trmnl"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "push_to_trmnl" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool push_to_trmnl · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_startedingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datanewsingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datapublish_pageingests untrusted inputpush_to_trmnlnetwork egressread_chartingests untrusted inputdescribe_pagespecno sensitive capabilitydescribe_typeno sensitive capabilitygalleryno sensitive capabilitylist_palettesno sensitive capabilitymcp_statusno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
my_pagesno sensitive capabilityrender_chartno sensitive capabilityrender_pageno sensitive capabilityreport_issueno sensitive capabilityshare_chartno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.30 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.7.29 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.7.27 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.7.26 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.7.25 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.7.24 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v0.7.23 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.7.21 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.7.19 |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.7.18 |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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