Simple Ssh — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "simple-ssh-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "simple-ssh-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "simple-ssh-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ssh_sftp_download → ssh_get_logs → ssh_exec. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "ssh_sftp_download → ssh_get_logs → ssh_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"ssh_sftp_download"
],
"sources": [
"ssh_get_logs"
],
"sinks": [
"ssh_exec",
"ssh_sudo_exec",
"ssh_exec_background",
"ssh_exec_poll",
"ssh_exec_poll_list",
"ssh_exec_cancel",
"ssh_shell_open",
"ssh_shell_write",
"ssh_shell_read",
"ssh_shell_resize",
"ssh_shell_close",
"ssh_shell_list"
],
"path": [
"ssh_sftp_download",
"ssh_get_logs",
"ssh_exec"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "ssh_sftp_download",
"to": "ssh_get_logs",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "ssh_get_logs",
"to": "ssh_exec",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1036`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1036
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_sudo_exec\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_sudo_exec\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_sudo_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_exec_background\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_background\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_background"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_exec_poll\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_poll\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_poll"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_exec_poll_list\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_poll_list\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_poll_list"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_exec_cancel\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_cancel\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_cancel"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_shell_open\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_open\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_open"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_shell_write\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_write\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_write"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_shell_read\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_read\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_read"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_shell_resize\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_resize\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_resize"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_shell_close\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_close\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_close"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_shell_list\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_list\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_list"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:516`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(`${envStr}${",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 516
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_exec\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_sudo_exec\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_sudo_exec\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_sudo_exec"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_exec_background\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_background\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_background"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_exec_poll\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_poll\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_poll"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_exec_poll_list\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_poll_list\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_poll_list"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_exec_cancel\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_exec_cancel\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_exec_cancel"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_shell_open\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_open\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_open"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_shell_write\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_write\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_write"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_shell_read\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_read\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_read"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_shell_resize\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_resize\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_resize"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_shell_close\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_close\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_close"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_shell_list\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_shell_list\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_shell_list"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"ssh_sftp_download"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ssh_get_logs"
],
"externalSink": [
"ssh_exec",
"ssh_sudo_exec",
"ssh_exec_background",
"ssh_exec_poll",
"ssh_exec_poll_list",
"ssh_exec_cancel",
"ssh_shell_open",
"ssh_shell_write",
"ssh_shell_read",
"ssh_shell_resize",
"ssh_shell_close",
"ssh_shell_list"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"ssh_sftp_download",
"ssh_get_logs",
"ssh_exec"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: ssh_sftp_download → ssh_get_logs → ssh_exec."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ssh_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_disconnect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_list_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_session_ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_exec",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sudo_exec",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_exec_background",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_exec_poll",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_exec_poll_list",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_exec_cancel",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_shell_open",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_shell_write",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_shell_read",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_shell_resize",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_shell_close",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_shell_list",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_download",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_stat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_port_forward_local",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_port_forward_remote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_port_forward_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_port_forward_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_system_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_get_logs",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_logs\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "37927464bfd56fab46ddd0847e0d666adbc90b9bc93f43f16176b9a73188529a",
"stats": {
"tools": 29,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 13,
"medium": 1,
"low": 12,
"info": 0
}
}
}