Simple Ssh MCP Server

simple-ssh-mcp-server npm v0.1.1

Published by bhayanak — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for SSH/SFTP remote operations

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Trust grade

83/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

B · 83/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Critical

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

B Why this grade threat 94 − adoption risk = 83/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−6.3	Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009	injection

2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−10	capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 27

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ssh_sftp_download → ssh_get_logs → ssh_exec. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow ssh_sftp_download → ssh_get_logs → ssh_exec

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1036`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: al machine (e.g. ~/.ssh/id_rsa)"), passphrase: z.string().optional().describe("Passphrase for encrypted private ke

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

high Tool "ssh_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_exec

high Tool "ssh_sudo_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_sudo_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_sudo_exec

high Tool "ssh_exec_background" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_exec_background" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_exec_background

high Tool "ssh_exec_poll" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_exec_poll" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_exec_poll

high Tool "ssh_exec_poll_list" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_exec_poll_list" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_exec_poll_list

high Tool "ssh_exec_cancel" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_exec_cancel" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_exec_cancel

high Tool "ssh_shell_open" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_shell_open" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_shell_open

high Tool "ssh_shell_write" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_shell_write" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_shell_write

high Tool "ssh_shell_read" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_shell_read" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_shell_read

high Tool "ssh_shell_resize" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_shell_resize" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_shell_resize

high Tool "ssh_shell_close" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_shell_close" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_shell_close

high Tool "ssh_shell_list" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "ssh_shell_list" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool ssh_shell_list

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:516`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: session.connection.exec(`${envStr}${fullCommand}`, (err, stream) => { if (err) { reject(err);

Location: server dist/index.js

low Mutating tool "ssh_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.