@shodh/memory-mcp
npm
v0.2.0
Published by @shodh — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for persistent AI memory - store and recall context across sessions
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4881`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import * as path from "path"; import * as fs from "fs"; import * as crypto from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.cjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; const REPO = 'varun29ankuS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.cjs
"@shodh/memory-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.cjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @shodh/memory-mcp
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_projectno sensitive capabilityadd_todono sensitive capabilityadd_todo_commentno sensitive capabilityarchive_projectno sensitive capabilityAvailable Commandsno sensitive capabilitybackup_createno sensitive capabilitybackup_listno sensitive capabilitybackup_purgeno sensitive capabilitybackup_restoreno sensitive capabilitybackup_verifyno sensitive capabilitycomplete_todono sensitive capabilityconsolidation_reportno sensitive capabilitycontext_summaryno sensitive capabilitycountno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_todono sensitive capabilitydelete_todo_commentno sensitive capabilitydismiss_reminderno sensitive capabilityforgetno sensitive capabilitylist_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_remindersno sensitive capabilitylist_subtasksno sensitive capabilitylist_todo_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_todosno sensitive capabilityMemory by IDno sensitive capabilityMemory Statisticsno sensitive capabilityMemory Statsno sensitive capabilitymemory_healthno sensitive capabilitymemory_statsno sensitive capabilityPending Workno sensitive capabilitypending_workno sensitive capabilityproactive_contextno sensitive capabilityqueryno sensitive capabilityquick_recallno sensitive capabilityread_memoryno sensitive capabilityrecallno sensitive capabilityrecall_by_tagsno sensitive capabilityrecent_memoriesno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityreorder_todono sensitive capabilityrepair_indexno sensitive capabilityreset_token_sessionno sensitive capabilitySearch Memoriesno sensitive capabilitySession Summaryno sensitive capabilitysession_summaryno sensitive capabilityset_reminderno sensitive capabilityTodo Listno sensitive capabilitytodo_statsno sensitive capabilitytoken_statusno sensitive capabilitytopicno sensitive capabilityupdate_todono sensitive capabilityupdate_todo_commentno sensitive capabilityverify_indexno sensitive capabilitywhat_i_knowno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @shodh/memory-mcp --online
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