Sexai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "sexai-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "sexai-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "sexai-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"publish_agent\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"publish_agent\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "publish_agent"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"update_agent\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"update_agent\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_agent"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([list_skills, get_private]) co-exist with external-action tools ([publish_agent, update_agent]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_skills → publish_agent"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [list_skills, get_private] → sinks [publish_agent, update_agent]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"list_skills",
"get_private"
],
"sinks": [
"publish_agent",
"update_agent"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"mcp_command\" on \"publish_agent\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"publish_agent\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"mcp_command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "publish_agent",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.mcp_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "mcp_command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"mcp_command\" on \"update_agent\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"update_agent\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"mcp_command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_agent",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.mcp_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "mcp_command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (src/index.mjs)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (a public-by-design (anon/publishable) key — RLS, not secrecy, protects it) appears in `src/index.mjs:21`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.mjs"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "src/index.mjs",
"line": 21
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"publish_agent\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"publish_agent\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "publish_agent"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"update_agent\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"update_agent\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "update_agent"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"list_skills",
"get_private"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"publish_agent",
"update_agent"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_skills",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "breed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_agent",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "connect_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_private",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "set_listing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_8004_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_8004",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_agent",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_payment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_lineage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_payment_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3eca6929458c316eb0da1fbde58aec6c9cca50c7cc0c677e7c0591289b4c40cb",
"stats": {
"tools": 18,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 3,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}