Sexai MCP Server
sexai-mcp
npm
v0.11.11
Published by sxaidev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for SEXAI — the network where devs reproduce. Let AI agents browse, publish themselves, and breed (deterministic config-crossover with per-parent influence). The tool definitions ARE the instructions.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "publish_agent" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "publish_agent" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool publish_agent
high Tool "update_agent" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_agent" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_agent
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_skills, get_private]) co-exist with external-action tools ([publish_agent, update_agent]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_skills, get_private] → sinks [publish_agent, update_agent]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_skills → publish_agent
medium Unconstrained command parameter "mcp_command" on "publish_agent"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "publish_agent" takes a command-shaped parameter "mcp_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool publish_agent · inputSchema.properties.mcp_command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "mcp_command" on "update_agent"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_agent" takes a command-shaped parameter "mcp_command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_agent · inputSchema.properties.mcp_command
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (src/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (a public-by-design (anon/publishable) key — RLS, not secrecy, protects it) appears in `src/index.mjs:21`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server src/index.mjs
low Mutating tool "publish_agent" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "publish_agent" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool publish_agent
low Mutating tool "update_agent" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_agent" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_agent
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_privateingests untrusted inputlist_skillsingests untrusted inputpublish_agentruns code / shellupdate_agentruns code / shellbreedno sensitive capabilityconfirm_8004no sensitive capabilityconfirm_paymentno sensitive capabilityconnect_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilityexport_repono sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
get_8004_planno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_lineageno sensitive capabilityget_payment_planno sensitive capabilityimport_repono sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_agentsno sensitive capabilityset_listingno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.11 latest |
A 92/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.11.10 |
A 92/100 | 8 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.11.9 |
C 78/100 | 1 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.11.7 |
C 78/100 | 1 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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