Sharepoint (npm) MCP Server
server-sharepoint
npm
v1.0.14
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
[](https://nodejs.org/en/download/) [](https://learn.mic
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 8 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/azure_cert_auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/azure_cert_auth.js:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require('child_process').execSync(`powershell -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/azure_cert_auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/azure_cert_auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/azure_cert_auth.js:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = require('child_process').execSync(`powershell -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'pipe',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/azure_cert_auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/graph_cert_auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/graph_cert_auth.js:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); // Create temporary directory if it doesn't exist const tempDir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/graph_cert_auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/jwt_utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/jwt_utils.js:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); // First, check if the certificate exists in the store const ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/jwt_utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/azure_cert_auth.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/azure_cert_auth.ts:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = require('child_process').execSync(`powershell -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'pipe',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/azure_cert_auth.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/azure_cert_auth.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/azure_cert_auth.js:67`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire('child_process').execSync(`powershell -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'inherit' }); if (fs.exi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/azure_cert_auth.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/src/azure_cert_auth.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/src/azure_cert_auth.js:60`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire('child_process').execSync(`powershell -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'pipe', encoding
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/azure_cert_auth.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/azure_cert_auth.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/azure_cert_auth.ts:29`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire('child_process').execSync(`powershell -Command "${psCommand}"`, { stdio: 'pipe', encoding
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/azure_cert_auth.ts
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
addGroupMemberno sensitive capabilityaddNavigationLinkno sensitive capabilityaddViewFieldno sensitive capabilitybatchCreateListItemsno sensitive capabilitybatchDeleteListItemsno sensitive capabilitybatchUpdateListItemsno sensitive capabilitycreateListno sensitive capabilitycreateListContentTypeno sensitive capabilitycreateListFieldno sensitive capabilitycreateListItemno sensitive capability
Show 47 more tools ↓
createListViewno sensitive capabilitycreateModernPageno sensitive capabilitydeleteListno sensitive capabilitydeleteListContentTypeno sensitive capabilitydeleteListFieldno sensitive capabilitydeleteListItemno sensitive capabilitydeleteListViewno sensitive capabilitydeleteModernPageno sensitive capabilitydeleteNavigationLinkno sensitive capabilitydeleteSiteContentTypeno sensitive capabilitydeleteSubsiteno sensitive capabilitygetAllSitesno sensitive capabilitygetGlobalNavigationLinksno sensitive capabilitygetGroupMembersno sensitive capabilitygetListContentTypeno sensitive capabilitygetListContentTypesno sensitive capabilitygetListFieldsno sensitive capabilitygetListItemsno sensitive capabilitygetListsno sensitive capabilitygetListViewsno sensitive capabilitygetModernPageno sensitive capabilitygetModernPagesno sensitive capabilitygetQuickNavigationLinksno sensitive capabilitygetRegionalSettingsno sensitive capabilitygetSiteno sensitive capabilitygetSiteCollectionFeaturesno sensitive capabilitygetSiteContentTypeno sensitive capabilitygetSiteContentTypesno sensitive capabilitygetSiteFeatureno sensitive capabilitygetSiteFeaturesno sensitive capabilitygetSiteGroupsno sensitive capabilitygetSiteUsersno sensitive capabilitygetSubsitesno sensitive capabilitygetViewFieldsno sensitive capabilitymoveViewFieldTono sensitive capabilityremoveAllViewFieldsno sensitive capabilityremoveGroupMemberno sensitive capabilityremoveViewFieldno sensitive capabilitysearchSharePointSiteno sensitive capabilityupdateListno sensitive capabilityupdateListContentTypeno sensitive capabilityupdateListFieldno sensitive capabilityupdateListItemno sensitive capabilityupdateListViewno sensitive capabilityupdateNavigationLinkno sensitive capabilityupdateSiteno sensitive capabilityupdateSiteContentTypeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.14 latest |
B 81/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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