Scitex Writer — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "scitex-writer",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "scitex-writer"
},
"server": {
"name": "scitex-writer"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py:60`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py"
},
"evidence": "ame}_structure\" eval(validator_func_name)(project_dir) logger.info( f\"{func_name}: Validated tree st",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js"
},
"evidence": "mentation.PLURAL_EXPR = new Function( \"n\", `return (${catalog.plural_expr})`, ); Documentation.LOCAL",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py"
},
"evidence": "ame}_structure\" eval(validator_func_name)(project_dir) logger.info( f\"{func_name}: Validated tree st",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py:229`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py"
},
"evidence": ", \"ab\") as log: subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=log, stderr=log, start_new_session=True) deadline = time.monoto",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py",
"line": 229,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py"
},
"evidence": "\"] = \"1\" process = subprocess.Popen( command, shell=False, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py",
"line": 57,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py:130`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py"
},
"evidence": "build_result = subprocess.run( build_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py",
"line": 130,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( [binary, flag], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5 ).",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py"
},
"evidence": ") result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"log\", \"--oneline\", str(rel_path)], cwd=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py",
"line": 124,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js"
},
"evidence": "(a.split(\"+\").at(-1)))}}exec(t,e){if(!this.allKeys.has(e.key))return;const s=this.callbacks.get(b(this,Ah,nu).call(this,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(project_dir), capture_output=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(project_path), capture_output=T",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py:213`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py"
},
"evidence": "continue subprocess.run( [ binary, \"--headless\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py",
"line": 213,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py"
},
"evidence": "ath)]) result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncode != 0:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:2`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js"
},
"evidence": "l)?n(this,qr,Wl):(await import(this.workerSrc)).WorkerMessageHandler)())}};Th=new WeakMap,Rn=new WeakMap,kn=new WeakMap,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"scitex-writer\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "scitex-writer"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_list_entries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_references",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_float_order",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_limits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_overflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_paper_symlink",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_media_provenance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_caption_footnote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_ref_integrity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_apply_citation_style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_format",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_render",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_clean_artifacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_manuscript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_supplementary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_revision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_export_manuscript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_render",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_convert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_pdf_to_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_guidelines_list_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_guidelines_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_guidelines_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_migration_from_overleaf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_migration_to_overleaf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_clone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_get_pdf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_list_document_types",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_prompts_generate_asta",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_skills_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_skills_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_render",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_csv_to_latex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_latex_to_csv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_tables_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_update_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_count_words",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d192ce21791903c4ab5eb189633d6afd29dc51dbb8ec286a0dfc23d6dd17365e",
"stats": {
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