Scitex Writer — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "scitex-writer",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "scitex-writer"
},
"server": {
"name": "scitex-writer"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 68,
"threatScore": 83,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_latexmk.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_latexmk.py:76`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_latexmk.py"
},
"evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_latexmk.py",
"line": 76
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py:60`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js"
},
"evidence": "new Function(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js"
},
"evidence": "new Function(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py:229`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py",
"line": 229
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py",
"line": 57
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py:130`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py",
"line": 130
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py",
"line": 72
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py",
"line": 124
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js",
"line": 2
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py",
"line": 39
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py",
"line": 33
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py:213`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py",
"line": 213
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py",
"line": 39
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:2`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js"
},
"evidence": "import(this.workerSrc)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js",
"line": 2
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"scitex-writer\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "scitex-writer"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"scitex-writer\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "scitex-writer"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "writer_compile_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_list_entries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_bib_merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_references",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_float_order",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_limits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_overflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_paper_symlink",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_media_provenance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_caption_footnote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_checks_ref_integrity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_apply_citation_style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_format",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_claim_render",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_clean_artifacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_manuscript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_supplementary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_revision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_compile_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_export_manuscript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_render",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_convert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_pdf_to_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_figures_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_guidelines_list_sections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_guidelines_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_guidelines_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_migration_from_overleaf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_migration_to_overleaf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_clone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "writer_project_get_pdf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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