Scitex Writer MCP Server
scitex-writer
PyPI
v2.42.0
Published by ywatanabe1989 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
LaTeX manuscript compilation system for scientific documents with MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py:60`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ame}_structure" eval(validator_func_name)(project_dir) logger.info( f"{func_name}: Validated tree st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mentation.PLURAL_EXPR = new Function( "n", `return (${catalog.plural_expr})`, ); Documentation.LOCAL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ame}_structure" eval(validator_func_name)(project_dir) logger.info( f"{func_name}: Validated tree st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_utils/_verify_tree_structure.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py:229`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , "ab") as log: subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=log, stderr=log, start_new_session=True) deadline = time.monoto
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_cli/commands/gui.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "] = "1" process = subprocess.Popen( command, shell=False, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_compile/_execute.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py:130`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: build_result = subprocess.run( build_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_compile/content.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( [binary, flag], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5 ).
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_core/_engines.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) result = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", "--oneline", str(rel_path)], cwd=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_dataclasses/core/_DocumentSection.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (a.split("+").at(-1)))}}exec(t,e){if(!this.allKeys.has(e.key))return;const s=this.callbacks.get(b(this,Ah,nu).call(this,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(project_dir), capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_checks.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(project_path), capture_output=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_export.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py:213`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: continue subprocess.run( [ binary, "--headless",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_figures_media.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath)]) result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_mcp/handlers/_project.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js:2`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l)?n(this,qr,Wl):(await import(this.workerSrc)).WorkerMessageHandler)())}};Th=new WeakMap,Rn=new WeakMap,kn=new WeakMap,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_writer/_django/static/writer/assets/pdf.js
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
writer_bib_list_filesreads sensitive datawriter_skills_getingests untrusted inputget_usageno sensitive capabilitywriter_apply_citation_styleno sensitive capabilitywriter_bib_addno sensitive capabilitywriter_bib_getno sensitive capabilitywriter_bib_list_entriesno sensitive capabilitywriter_bib_mergeno sensitive capabilitywriter_bib_removeno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_caption_footnoteno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
writer_checks_float_orderno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_limitsno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_media_provenanceno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_overflowno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_paper_symlinkno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_ref_integrityno sensitive capabilitywriter_checks_referencesno sensitive capabilitywriter_claim_addno sensitive capabilitywriter_claim_formatno sensitive capabilitywriter_claim_getno sensitive capabilitywriter_claim_listno sensitive capabilitywriter_claim_removeno sensitive capabilitywriter_claim_renderno sensitive capabilitywriter_clean_artifactsno sensitive capabilitywriter_compile_archiveno sensitive capabilitywriter_compile_contentno sensitive capabilitywriter_compile_diffno sensitive capabilitywriter_compile_manuscriptno sensitive capabilitywriter_compile_revisionno sensitive capabilitywriter_compile_supplementaryno sensitive capabilitywriter_count_wordsno sensitive capabilitywriter_export_manuscriptno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_addno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_archiveno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_convertno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_listno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_pdf_to_imagesno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_removeno sensitive capabilitywriter_figures_renderno sensitive capabilitywriter_guidelines_buildno sensitive capabilitywriter_guidelines_getno sensitive capabilitywriter_guidelines_list_sectionsno sensitive capabilitywriter_migration_from_overleafno sensitive capabilitywriter_migration_to_overleafno sensitive capabilitywriter_project_cloneno sensitive capabilitywriter_project_get_pdfno sensitive capabilitywriter_project_infono sensitive capabilitywriter_project_list_document_typesno sensitive capabilitywriter_prompts_generate_astano sensitive capabilitywriter_skills_listno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_addno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_archiveno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_csv_to_latexno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_latex_to_csvno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_listno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_removeno sensitive capabilitywriter_tables_renderno sensitive capabilitywriter_update_projectno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.42.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.41.0 |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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