Raw scan report

Sad — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "sad-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "sad-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "sad-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 94,
    "threatScore": 99,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 1.2,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
        "category": "exfiltration",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "heuristic",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.4,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "moderate",
        "label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 3
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
        "appliedPenalty": 2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "moderate",
    "reasons": [
      "ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
      "can create, modify or delete files"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "untrusted-input",
      "file-write"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
      "title": "Tool \"uml_write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"uml_write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
      "remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "uml_write_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
      "title": "Hardcoded Google API key in server code (dist/drive.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "A hardcoded Google API key (a client API key (restricted by referrer/quota, not a private secret)) appears in `dist/drive.js:15`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
      "remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/drive.js"
      },
      "evidence": "Google API key: AIza…(redacted)",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "secretType": "google-api-key",
        "file": "dist/drive.js",
        "line": 15
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"uml_write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"uml_write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "uml_write_file"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "file-write"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
      "title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filename\" on \"uml_write_file\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"uml_write_file\" takes a path parameter \"filename\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
      "remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "uml_write_file",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.filename"
      },
      "data": {
        "param": "filename"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package declares no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"sad-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "sad-mcp"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "search_materials",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_material",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_materials",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "quiz",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_exams",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "practice_exam",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"download\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "interview_stakeholder",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "bpmn_analysis",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "bpmn_validate_model",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "bpmn_render",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "uml_use_case",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "uml_class_diagram",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "uml_state_diagram",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "uml_write_file",
      "tags": [
        "file-write"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "file-write": [
          "keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "version",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "uml_usecase_validate_model",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "b0cfd791586876d4a0d21b377a817fb09707d93dab493a59329608552b9577ef",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 16,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 0,
      "medium": 1,
      "low": 3,
      "info": 1
    }
  }
}