Sad MCP Server
sad-mcp
npm
v2.10.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Software Analysis and Design course materials at BGU
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded Google API key in server code MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 5 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
medium Tool "uml_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "uml_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool uml_write_file
low Hardcoded Google API key in server code (dist/drive.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Google API key (a client API key (restricted by referrer/quota, not a private secret)) appears in `dist/drive.js:15`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/drive.js
low Mutating tool "uml_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "uml_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool uml_write_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "uml_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "uml_write_file" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool uml_write_file · inputSchema.properties.filename
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
practice_examingests untrusted inputuml_write_filewrites filesbpmn_analysisno sensitive capabilitybpmn_renderno sensitive capabilitybpmn_validate_modelno sensitive capabilityget_materialno sensitive capabilityinterview_stakeholderno sensitive capabilitylist_examsno sensitive capabilitylist_materialsno sensitive capabilityquizno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
search_materialsno sensitive capabilityuml_class_diagramno sensitive capabilityuml_state_diagramno sensitive capabilityuml_use_caseno sensitive capabilityuml_usecase_validate_modelno sensitive capabilityversionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.10.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.10.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.9.6 |
A 95/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v2.9.5 |
A 95/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v2.9.3 |
A 95/100 | 3 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v2.9.0 |
A 95/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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