Rubrkit — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "https://www.rubrkit.com/api/v1/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "http",
"origin": "https://www.rubrkit.com/api/v1/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "rubrkit",
"version": "0.1.0"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 90,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "live",
"label": "inspection depth (live) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "live",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": false,
"packageMetadata": false,
"liveTransport": true
},
"caveats": []
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: rubrkit_read_proof_report → rubrkit_list_artifact_files → rubrkit_read_eval. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "rubrkit_read_proof_report → rubrkit_list_artifact_files → rubrkit_read_eval"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"rubrkit_read_proof_report"
],
"sources": [
"rubrkit_list_artifact_files"
],
"sinks": [
"rubrkit_read_eval"
],
"path": [
"rubrkit_read_proof_report",
"rubrkit_list_artifact_files",
"rubrkit_read_eval"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "rubrkit_read_proof_report",
"to": "rubrkit_list_artifact_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "rubrkit_list_artifact_files",
"to": "rubrkit_read_eval",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"rubrkit_read_eval\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"rubrkit_read_eval\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "rubrkit_read_eval"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"rubrkit_read_eval\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"rubrkit_read_eval\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "rubrkit_read_eval"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-NET-005",
"title": "Remote HTTP MCP endpoint",
"category": "network",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Remote endpoint www.rubrkit.com. MCP Trust Checker does not test server-side authentication/authorization; verify the endpoint requires auth.",
"location": {
"kind": "transport"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"rubrkit_read_proof_report"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"rubrkit_list_artifact_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"rubrkit_read_eval"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"rubrkit_read_proof_report",
"rubrkit_list_artifact_files",
"rubrkit_read_eval"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: rubrkit_read_proof_report → rubrkit_list_artifact_files → rubrkit_read_eval."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "rubrkit_search_api_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_api_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_openapi_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_create_artifact_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_artifact_bundles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_artifact_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_delete_artifact_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_hard_delete_artifact_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_upload_artifact_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_artifact_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_artifact_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_update_artifact_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_start_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_audits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_apply_audit_rewrite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_convert_to_rubr_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_rubr_flow_conversions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_rubr_flow_conversion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_poll_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_job_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_artifact_bundle_versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_restore_artifact_bundle_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_file_versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_restore_file_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_run_evals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_evals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_eval",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_export_proof_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_proof_report",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_golden_cases",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_add_golden_case",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_retire_golden_case",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_create_drift_monitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_list_drift_monitors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_drift_observations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_run_drift_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_set_drift_monitor_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_record_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_input_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rubrkit_read_validity_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "80c1a8527340cfd64f97c82e1149e0b018992ec32ad5cb2b84171a86084ed13c",
"stats": {
"tools": 41,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 2,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}