https://www.rubrkit.com/api/v1/mcp
Remote
v0.1.0
Published by rubrkit.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP-native AI evaluation: rubric audits, eval suites, and proof reports for AI/LLM output.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: rubrkit_read_proof_report → rubrkit_list_artifact_files → rubrkit_read_eval. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow rubrkit_read_proof_report → rubrkit_list_artifact_files → rubrkit_read_eval
Tool "rubrkit_read_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool rubrkit_read_eval
Tool "rubrkit_read_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool rubrkit_read_eval
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
rubrkit_list_artifact_filesreads sensitive datarubrkit_read_evalruns code / shellrubrkit_read_proof_reportingests untrusted inputrubrkit_add_golden_caseno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_apply_audit_rewriteno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_convert_to_rubr_flowno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_create_artifact_bundleno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_create_drift_monitorno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_delete_artifact_bundleno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_export_proof_reportno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_hard_delete_artifact_bundleno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_artifact_bundle_versionsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_artifact_bundlesno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_auditsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_drift_monitorsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_evalsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_file_versionsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_golden_casesno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_job_eventsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_list_rubr_flow_conversionsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_poll_jobno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_api_docno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_artifact_bundleno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_artifact_fileno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_auditno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_drift_observationsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_input_driftno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_openapi_contractno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_rubr_flow_conversionno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_read_validity_driftno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_record_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_restore_artifact_bundle_versionno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_restore_file_versionno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_retire_golden_caseno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_run_drift_checkno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_run_evalsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_search_api_docsno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_set_drift_monitor_statusno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_start_auditno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_update_artifact_fileno sensitive capabilityrubrkit_upload_artifact_filesno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 90/100 | 3 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan https://www.rubrkit.com/api/v1/mcp --online
Security scan results for the Agent MCP server.
Security scan results for the Agent Claim MCP server.
Security scan results for the Agent Comm MCP server.
Security scan results for the Agent Comm MCP server.
Security scan results for the Agent Mcp Manager MCP server.
Security scan results for the Agent Mesh MCP server.