Root — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "root-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "root-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "root-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 72,
"threatScore": 83,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py:289`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py",
"line": 289
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py:289`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py",
"line": 289
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py:45`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py",
"line": 45
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (tests/test_root_executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_root_executor.py:151`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_root_executor.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_root_executor.py",
"line": 151
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py",
"line": 46
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py:201`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py",
"line": 201
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_root_executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_root_executor.py:147`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_root_executor.py"
},
"evidence": "exec(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_root_executor.py",
"line": 147
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (tests/test_root_executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_root_executor.py:158`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_root_executor.py"
},
"evidence": "__import__(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_root_executor.py",
"line": 158
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"inspect_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"inspect_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "inspect_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"list_branches\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"list_branches\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_branches",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"validate_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"validate_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_branches\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_branches\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_branches",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"get_branch_stats\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_branch_stats\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_branch_stats",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"export_data\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"export_data\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "export_data",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"output_path\" on \"export_data\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"export_data\" takes a path parameter \"output_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "export_data",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.output_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "output_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"compute_histogram\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"compute_histogram\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "compute_histogram",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"compute_histogram_2d\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"compute_histogram_2d\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "compute_histogram_2d",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"fit_histogram\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"fit_histogram\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "fit_histogram",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"compute_invariant_mass\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"compute_invariant_mass\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "compute_invariant_mass",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"compute_correlation\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"compute_correlation\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "compute_correlation",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"plot_histogram_1d\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"plot_histogram_1d\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "plot_histogram_1d",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"output_path\" on \"plot_histogram_1d\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"plot_histogram_1d\" takes a path parameter \"output_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "plot_histogram_1d",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.output_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "output_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"output_path\" on \"run_root_macro\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run_root_macro\" takes a path parameter \"output_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_root_macro",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.output_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "output_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"root-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "root-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_branches",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "validate_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_branches",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_branch_stats",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "export_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"export_data\"",
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "switch_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_server_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_histogram",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "compute_histogram_2d",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "fit_histogram",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "compute_invariant_mass",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "compute_correlation",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "plot_histogram_1d",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "plot_histogram_2d",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "histogram_arithmetic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_root_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_rdataframe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_root_macro",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1cdfa6d0ecad4eddafc097c93fc25d1a91eb68ca28a2ea49f96c915cb41134f4",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 1,
"low": 16,
"info": 0
}
}
}