Root — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "root-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "root-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "root-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py:289`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py"
},
"evidence": "result = eval(expr, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, namespace) # Add the new field to the array",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py",
"line": 289,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py:289`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py"
},
"evidence": "result = eval(expr, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, namespace) # Add the new field to the array",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py",
"line": 289,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py:45`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py"
},
"evidence": "ate expressions without eval(). \"\"\" def __init__(self, names: dict[str, Any]): \"\"\" Initialize e",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"root-config\", \"--libdir\"], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, script_path], capture_output=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py",
"line": 202,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_root_executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_root_executor.py:148`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_root_executor.py"
},
"evidence": "elf.validator.validate(\"exec('print(1)')\") assert result.is_valid is False def test_blocks_eval(self):",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_root_executor.py",
"line": 148,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_root_executor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_root_executor.py:159`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_root_executor.py"
},
"evidence": "se def test_blocks___import__(self): result = self.validator.validate(\"__import__('os')\") assert re",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/test_root_executor.py",
"line": 159,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_branch_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_data",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"export_data\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "switch_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_server_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_histogram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_histogram_2d",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fit_histogram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_invariant_mass",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compute_correlation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_histogram_1d",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plot_histogram_2d",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "histogram_arithmetic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_root_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_rdataframe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_root_macro",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cfc20fcc4f704e2efccde957d7a96ea05e8086173a8ac7c085487278f9f2da37",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}