Root MCP Server
root-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by mohamedelashri — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Production-grade MCP server for CERN ROOT file analysis
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py:289`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = eval(expr, {"__builtins__": {}}, namespace) # Add the new field to the array
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py:289`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = eval(expr, {"__builtins__": {}}, namespace) # Add the new field to the array
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/root_mcp/core/operations/basic_stats.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py:45`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ate expressions without eval(). """ def __init__(self, names: dict[str, Any]): """ Initialize e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/root_mcp/extended/analysis/expression.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["root-config", "--libdir"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, script_path], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_root_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_root_executor.py:148`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: elf.validator.validate("exec('print(1)')") assert result.is_valid is False def test_blocks_eval(self):
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_root_executor.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_root_executor.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_root_executor.py:159`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: se def test_blocks___import__(self): result = self.validator.validate("__import__('os')") assert re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_root_executor.py
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_datareads sensitive datalist_filesreads sensitive datacompute_correlationno sensitive capabilitycompute_histogramno sensitive capabilitycompute_histogram_2dno sensitive capabilitycompute_invariant_massno sensitive capabilityfit_histogramno sensitive capabilityget_branch_statsno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilityhistogram_arithmeticno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
inspect_fileno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilityplot_histogram_1dno sensitive capabilityplot_histogram_2dno sensitive capabilityread_branchesno sensitive capabilityrun_rdataframeno sensitive capabilityrun_root_codeno sensitive capabilityrun_root_macrono sensitive capabilityswitch_modeno sensitive capabilityvalidate_fileno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.1.7 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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