Webhook Tools MCP Server
@rog0x/mcp-webhook-tools
npm
v1.0.2
Published by @rog0x — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Webhook management and testing tools for AI agents via MCP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "webhook_validate"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "webhook_validate" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow webhook_validate
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "webhook_debug"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "webhook_debug" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow webhook_debug
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([webhook_validate, webhook_debug]) and tools that can send data out ([webhook_send, webhook_validate, webhook_generate_payload, webhook_debug, webhook_retry_schedule]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [webhook_validate, webhook_debug] → sinks [webhook_send, webhook_validate, webhook_generate_payload, webhook_debug, webhook_retry_schedule]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow webhook_validate → webhook_send
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "webhook_send"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "webhook_send" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool webhook_send · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "webhook_debug"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "webhook_debug" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool webhook_debug · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 5
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
webhook_debugnetwork egressreads sensitive datawebhook_validatenetwork egressreads sensitive datawebhook_generate_payloadnetwork egresswebhook_retry_schedulenetwork egresswebhook_sendnetwork egress
Toxic flows 3
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @rog0x/mcp-webhook-tools --onlineMore in API Development
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