Revealui — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@revealui/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@revealui/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@revealui/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hypervisor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/hypervisor.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/hypervisor.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { registerCleanupHandler } from '@revealui/core/monitoring'; import { log",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/hypervisor.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/neon.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/neon.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/neon.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/servers/neon.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/next-devtools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/next-devtools.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/next-devtools.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createServer } from 'node:net'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/servers/next-devtools.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/playwright.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/playwright.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/playwright.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/servers/playwright.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/stripe.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/stripe.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/stripe.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/servers/stripe.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/vercel.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/vercel.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/vercel.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/servers/vercel.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/servers/_email-provider.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/_email-provider.js:36`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/_email-provider.js"
},
"evidence": "const tokenRes = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Conte",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/servers/_email-provider.js",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js:649`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js"
},
"evidence": "const ai = (await import(specifier)); cachedEmbedder = async (text) => { const result",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js",
"line": 649,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "contracts_list_categories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contracts_get_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "catalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_list_libraries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_resolve_library",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docs_get_library",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kg_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kg_get_node",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "kg_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kg_add_episode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kg_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kg_at_time",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kg_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_list_sites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_list_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_get_content",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_site_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_session_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_session_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_session_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_session_patch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revealui_page_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_send_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_publish_fact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_list_facts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_create_scratchpad",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_patch_scratchpad",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_read_scratchpad",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_share",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_list_shared",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_reconcile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_create_payment_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_list_customers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_get_customer",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "stripe_list_subscriptions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a9babf21e022e7a2f395bb173c82dd223a3935679b8fb7e7c6a12ea76a09f4bc",
"stats": {
"tools": 37,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}