Revealui MCP Server
@revealui/mcp
npm
v0.8.10
Source verified
Published by revealuistudio — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Model Context Protocol framework — first-party server launchers, adapter pattern, tool discovery, and an incubating multi-server hypervisor (not app-mounted by default; ADR-007).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/hypervisor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/hypervisor.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { registerCleanupHandler } from '@revealui/core/monitoring'; import { log
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/hypervisor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/neon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/neon.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/neon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/next-devtools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/next-devtools.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createServer } from 'node:net'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/next-devtools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/playwright.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/playwright.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/playwright.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/stripe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/stripe.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/stripe.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/servers/vercel.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/vercel.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { config } from 'dotenv'; import { createLauncherLogger, ExitCode, isDire
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/vercel.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/servers/_email-provider.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/_email-provider.js:36`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const tokenRes = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Conte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/_email-provider.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js:649`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const ai = (await import(specifier)); cachedEmbedder = async (text) => { const result
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/servers/factories/knowledge-graph.js
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kg_get_nodeingests untrusted inputrevealui_get_contentingests untrusted inputstripe_get_customeringests untrusted inputcatalogno sensitive capabilitycontracts_get_schemano sensitive capabilitycontracts_list_categoriesno sensitive capabilitydocs_get_libraryno sensitive capabilitydocs_list_librariesno sensitive capabilitydocs_resolve_libraryno sensitive capabilityemail_sendno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
email_send_batchno sensitive capabilitykg_add_episodeno sensitive capabilitykg_at_timeno sensitive capabilitykg_contextno sensitive capabilitykg_neighborsno sensitive capabilitykg_pathno sensitive capabilitykg_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_create_scratchpadno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_factsno sensitive capabilitymemory_list_sharedno sensitive capabilitymemory_patch_scratchpadno sensitive capabilitymemory_publish_factno sensitive capabilitymemory_read_scratchpadno sensitive capabilitymemory_reconcileno sensitive capabilitymemory_shareno sensitive capabilityrevealui_list_contentno sensitive capabilityrevealui_list_sitesno sensitive capabilityrevealui_list_usersno sensitive capabilityrevealui_page_readno sensitive capabilityrevealui_session_getno sensitive capabilityrevealui_session_listno sensitive capabilityrevealui_session_openno sensitive capabilityrevealui_session_patchno sensitive capabilityrevealui_site_statsno sensitive capabilitystripe_create_payment_intentno sensitive capabilitystripe_list_customersno sensitive capabilitystripe_list_subscriptionsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.10 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.8.9 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.8.8 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.8.7 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.8.6 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v0.8.4 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.8.3 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.8.1 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @revealui/mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
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