Repowire — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "repowire",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "repowire"
},
"server": {
"name": "repowire"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"spawn_peer\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"spawn_peer\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "spawn_peer"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/agent_backends.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/agent_backends.py:273`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/agent_backends.py"
},
"evidence": "try: subprocess.run([\"claude\", \"mcp\", \"remove\", \"repowire\"], capture_output=True) cmd = [",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/agent_backends.py",
"line": 273,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/cli.py:454`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/cli.py"
},
"evidence": ".[/]\") try: subprocess.run([\"npm\", \"install\"], cwd=web_dir, check=True) except FileNotFoundError:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/cli.py",
"line": 454,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/client.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/client.py:583`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/client.py"
},
"evidence": "onfig\")) async def spawn( self, path: str, command: str | None = None, *, b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/client.py",
"line": 583,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"tmux\", \"display-message\", \"-t\", peer.pane_id, \"-p\", \"#{pane_pid}\"]",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py",
"line": 37,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py:249`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py"
},
"evidence": "daemon restarted since /spawn (in-memory ownership set was lost). Caller can verify with `tmux list-panes`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py",
"line": 249,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"tmux\", \"capture-pane\", \"-pt\", pane_id, \"-S\", \"-80\"], c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py",
"line": 79,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py"
},
"evidence": "return command def spawn( self, *, path: str, backend: AgentType, profile:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py",
"line": 132,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/doctor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/doctor.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/doctor.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"tmux\", \"-V\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, )",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/doctor.py",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/hooks/_tmux.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/hooks/_tmux.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/hooks/_tmux.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"tmux\", \"display-message\", \"-p\", \"\"], capture_output=Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/hooks/_tmux.py",
"line": 32,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py"
},
"evidence": "\", session_id]) subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 — fixed argv, no shell argv, stdin=subpr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py",
"line": 64,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (repowire/doctor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repowire/doctor.py:464`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repowire/doctor.py"
},
"evidence": "f\"{import_count} import(s), {event_count} event(s), {mapping_count} peer mapping(s)\" ), ) def check",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "repowire/doctor.py",
"line": 464,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"spawn_peer\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"spawn_peer\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "spawn_peer"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"repowire\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "repowire"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_peers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_show",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "job_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ask",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait_on_ack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ask_many",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ask_many_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "answer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notify_peer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "broadcast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_description",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claim_orchestrator_role",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spawn_peer",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"spawn\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "orchestrator_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kill_peer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_reviewed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_self",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_cron",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "share_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_share",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fe84cfad8be13ecd75a68548f1f332a9cd4687a9dad6e623f2dd307fdb6c0aec",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}