Repowire MCP Server
repowire
PyPI
v0.17.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Tool "spawn_peer" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_peer" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_peer
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/agent_backends.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/agent_backends.py:273`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run(["claude", "mcp", "remove", "repowire"], capture_output=True) cmd = [
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/agent_backends.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/cli.py:454`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .[/]") try: subprocess.run(["npm", "install"], cwd=web_dir, check=True) except FileNotFoundError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/client.py:583`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onfig")) async def spawn( self, path: str, command: str | None = None, *, b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/client.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["tmux", "display-message", "-t", peer.pane_id, "-p", "#{pane_pid}"]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/daemon/registry_repair.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py:249`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: daemon restarted since /spawn (in-memory ownership set was lost). Caller can verify with `tmux list-panes`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/daemon/routes/spawn.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["tmux", "capture-pane", "-pt", pane_id, "-S", "-80"], c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/daemon/spawn_diagnostics.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return command def spawn( self, *, path: str, backend: AgentType, profile:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/daemon/spawn_service.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/doctor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/doctor.py:72`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["tmux", "-V"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/doctor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/hooks/_tmux.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/hooks/_tmux.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["tmux", "display-message", "-p", ""], capture_output=Tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/hooks/_tmux.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ", session_id]) subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 — fixed argv, no shell argv, stdin=subpr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/hooks/prompt_handler.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (repowire/doctor.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`repowire/doctor.py:464`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: f"{import_count} import(s), {event_count} event(s), {mapping_count} peer mapping(s)" ), ) def check
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repowire/doctor.py
low Mutating tool "spawn_peer" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_peer" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_peer
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
spawn_peerruns code / shellackno sensitive capabilityanswerno sensitive capabilityaskno sensitive capabilityask_manyno sensitive capabilityask_many_resultno sensitive capabilitybroadcastno sensitive capabilityclaim_orchestrator_roleno sensitive capabilityjob_cancelno sensitive capabilityjob_createno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
job_listno sensitive capabilityjob_resultno sensitive capabilityjob_showno sensitive capabilityjob_statusno sensitive capabilityjob_updateno sensitive capabilitykill_peerno sensitive capabilitylist_peersno sensitive capabilitymark_reviewedno sensitive capabilitynotify_peerno sensitive capabilityorchestrator_statusno sensitive capabilityreplyno sensitive capabilityreview_queueno sensitive capabilityrevoke_shareno sensitive capabilityschedule_createno sensitive capabilityschedule_cronno sensitive capabilityschedule_deleteno sensitive capabilityschedule_listno sensitive capabilityschedule_selfno sensitive capabilityset_descriptionno sensitive capabilityshare_sessionno sensitive capabilitywait_on_ackno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.17.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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