Repo Ctx — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "repo-ctx",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "repo-ctx"
},
"server": {
"name": "repo-ctx"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repo_ctx/joern/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repo_ctx/joern/cli.py:279`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repo_ctx/joern/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( full_args, capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repo_ctx/joern/cli.py",
"line": 279,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (repo_ctx/operations.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repo_ctx/operations.py:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repo_ctx/operations.py"
},
"evidence": "clone result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "repo_ctx/operations.py",
"line": 138,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py:106`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py"
},
"evidence": "y: module = __import__(self.config[\"module\"], fromlist=[\"language\"]) # Some packages use languag",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py",
"line": 106,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_enrichment.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_enrichment.py:230`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_enrichment.py"
},
"evidence": "e_request(): return requests.get(\"http://example.com\") ''' result = await service.enrich_code(code, \"python\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_enrichment.py",
"line": 230,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"ctx-dump\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ctx-dump\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ctx-dump",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"output_path\" on \"ctx-dump\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ctx-dump\" takes a path parameter \"output_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ctx-dump",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.output_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "output_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py:172`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py"
},
"evidence": "ds.\"\"\" result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"repo_ctx\", \"--help\"], capture_ou",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py",
"line": 172,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ctx-index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-dsm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-cycles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-layers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-architecture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-llmstxt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ctx-dump",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ecbf373c39b5ae8d3a99de7f25fcf87e21dc5a074ba9fb9fe242d8731da0bfa8",
"stats": {
"tools": 18,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}