Repo Ctx MCP Server
repo-ctx
PyPI
v0.8.0
Published by osick — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (repo_ctx/joern/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repo_ctx/joern/cli.py:279`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( full_args, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repo_ctx/joern/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (repo_ctx/operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`repo_ctx/operations.py:138`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: clone result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repo_ctx/operations.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py:106`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: module = __import__(self.config["module"], fromlist=["language"]) # Some packages use languag
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server repo_ctx/analysis/generic_extractor.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_enrichment.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_enrichment.py:230`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e_request(): return requests.get("http://example.com") ''' result = await service.enrich_code(code, "python"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_enrichment.py
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "ctx-dump"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ctx-dump" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ctx-dump · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "output_path" on "ctx-dump"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ctx-dump" takes a path parameter "output_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ctx-dump · inputSchema.properties.output_path
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py:172`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ds.""" result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "repo_ctx", "--help"], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli_flat_commands.py
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ctx-dumpreads sensitive datactx-analyzeno sensitive capabilityctx-architectureno sensitive capabilityctx-cyclesno sensitive capabilityctx-docsno sensitive capabilityctx-dsmno sensitive capabilityctx-exportno sensitive capabilityctx-graphno sensitive capabilityctx-indexno sensitive capabilityctx-layersno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
ctx-listno sensitive capabilityctx-llmstxtno sensitive capabilityctx-metricsno sensitive capabilityctx-queryno sensitive capabilityctx-searchno sensitive capabilityctx-statusno sensitive capabilityctx-symbolno sensitive capabilityctx-symbolsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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