Repo Context — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "repo-context-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "repo-context-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "repo-context-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/diagnostics.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/diagnostics.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/diagnostics.js"
},
"evidence": "= getDiagnostics; const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const util_1 = require(\"util\"); const path_1 = requi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/diagnostics.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/getFullContext.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/getFullContext.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/getFullContext.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const util_1 = require(\"util\"); const execFileAsync",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/getFullContext.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file\" on \"read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file\" takes a path parameter \"file\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file"
},
"data": {
"param": "file"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file\" on \"read_file_outline\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file_outline\" takes a path parameter \"file\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file_outline",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file"
},
"data": {
"param": "file"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file\" on \"read_file_symbol\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_file_symbol\" takes a path parameter \"file\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_file_symbol",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file"
},
"data": {
"param": "file"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"list_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"list_files\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"repo-context-mcp\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "repo-context-mcp"
},
"evidence": "node bin/repo-context-setup.js --auto || true",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_project_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "annotate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_file_outline",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_file_symbol",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_in_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_in_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "generate_project_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_diagnostics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project-context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "format",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project-summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file-reader-guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Project Summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Full Project Context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Tech Stack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Project Structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "API Endpoints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Data Models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Hot Files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Project Annotations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Import Graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "File Outlines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b4e9015723efb28ef6baa2eb7bb14f1ed7f959d7a7e4db487166e838c4b7bf0e",
"stats": {
"tools": 25,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}