repo-context-mcp
npm
v1.8.0
Published by jul879n — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal MCP server that analyzes any codebase and provides structured context to AI assistants, saving tokens by eliminating redundant project exploration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/diagnostics.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = getDiagnostics; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const path_1 = requi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/diagnostics.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/getFullContext.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const execFileAsync
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/getFullContext.js
Tool "read_file" takes a path parameter "file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file · inputSchema.properties.file
Tool "read_file_outline" takes a path parameter "file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file_outline · inputSchema.properties.file
Tool "read_file_symbol" takes a path parameter "file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file_symbol · inputSchema.properties.file
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
"repo-context-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node bin/repo-context-setup.js --auto || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package repo-context-mcp
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive dataread_file_outlinereads sensitive dataread_file_symbolreads sensitive dataannotateno sensitive capabilityAPI Endpointsno sensitive capabilityData Modelsno sensitive capabilityFile Outlinesno sensitive capabilityfile-reader-guideno sensitive capabilityformatno sensitive capabilityFull Project Contextno sensitive capabilitygenerate_project_docsno sensitive capabilityget_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityget_project_contextno sensitive capabilityHot Filesno sensitive capabilityImport Graphno sensitive capabilityProject Annotationsno sensitive capabilityProject Structureno sensitive capabilityProject Summaryno sensitive capabilityproject-contextno sensitive capabilityproject-summaryno sensitive capabilitysearch_in_fileno sensitive capabilitysearch_in_projectno sensitive capabilitysearch_symbolno sensitive capabilityTech Stackno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan repo-context-mcp --online
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