Rankup — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "rankup",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "rankup"
},
"server": {
"name": "rankup"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/update.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/update.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/update.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { join } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/update.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([site_crawl]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "site_crawl → send_webhook"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [site_crawl] → sinks [send_webhook]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"site_crawl"
],
"sinks": [
"send_webhook"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:51`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.rankup.tools/health\"); if (!response.ok) throw new Error(",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/cli/setup.js",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import { writeConfig, readConfig, configExists, getConfigDir } from \"./config.js",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/setup.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"site_crawl"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"send_webhook"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "clear_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "content_brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "content_calendar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "content_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "full_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "geo_optimize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "image_prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "internal_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "keyword_research",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "on_page_seo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "page_speed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_ghost",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_wordpress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quality_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schema_generate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "seo_strategy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "serp_tracker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "site_crawl",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "topical_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "780d98def2e6503091c75922685eb97491f6b0855d11b24c420a4b85f16ba584",
"stats": {
"tools": 26,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}