Rankup MCP Server
rankup
npm
v1.3.5
Published by akdenizemirhan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
RankUp MCP - All-in-one SEO toolkit for AI agents. 26 tools for keyword research, AI content writing, technical SEO, publishing and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/update.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/update.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([site_crawl]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [site_crawl] → sinks [send_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow site_crawl → send_webhook
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:51`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.rankup.tools/health"); if (!response.ok) throw new Error(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { writeConfig, readConfig, configExists, getConfigDir } from "./config.js
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/setup.js
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
send_webhooknetwork egresssite_crawlingests untrusted inputclear_sessionno sensitive capabilitycontent_briefno sensitive capabilitycontent_calendarno sensitive capabilitycontent_writeno sensitive capabilityfull_pipelineno sensitive capabilitygenerate_imageno sensitive capabilitygeo_optimizeno sensitive capabilityget_sessionno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
image_promptno sensitive capabilityinternal_linksno sensitive capabilitykeyword_researchno sensitive capabilitylist_contentno sensitive capabilityload_contentno sensitive capabilityon_page_seono sensitive capabilitypage_speedno sensitive capabilitypublish_contentno sensitive capabilitypublish_ghostno sensitive capabilitypublish_wordpressno sensitive capabilityquality_checkno sensitive capabilitysave_contentno sensitive capabilityschema_generateno sensitive capabilityseo_strategyno sensitive capabilityserp_trackerno sensitive capabilitytopical_mapno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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