Proton Drive — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "proton-drive-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "proton-drive-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "proton-drive-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/subprocess.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/subprocess.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/subprocess.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import { DriveCliError, DriveCliNotFoundE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/subprocess.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1",
"title": "Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"drive_auth_logout\" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.",
"remediation": "Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_auth_logout",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "keychain",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"drive_write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"drive_write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"drive_write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"drive_write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"drive_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"drive_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"drive_write_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"drive_write_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_write_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "drive_auth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_auth_logout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_download",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_mkdir",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_list_trash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_invite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_revoke",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_trash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_restore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_empty_trash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_copy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_list_invitations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_invitation_accept",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_invitation_reject",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_leave",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_set_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_remove_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_share_remove_all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_list_albums",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_create_album",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_update_album",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_delete_album",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_list_album_photos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_add_to_album",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_remove_from_album",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_list_timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "photos_download",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "photos_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_write_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9e08de7877ffc03650235ebce214d8b87a63e051b15c6fc303a8d38a3b6455ef",
"stats": {
"tools": 38,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}