Proton Drive MCP Server
proton-drive-mcp
npm
v1.0.35
Published by googlarz — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server and CLI that gives Claude full access to Proton Drive — upload, download, share, and manage your end-to-end encrypted files without leaving the conversation.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/subprocess.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/subprocess.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { DriveCliError, DriveCliNotFoundE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/subprocess.js
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "drive_auth_logout" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool drive_auth_logout · description
medium Tool "drive_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "drive_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool drive_write_file
low Mutating tool "drive_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "drive_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drive_write_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "drive_read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "drive_read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool drive_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "drive_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "drive_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool drive_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
drive_downloadingests untrusted inputdrive_read_filereads sensitive datadrive_write_filewrites filesphotos_downloadingests untrusted inputdrive_auth_logoutno sensitive capabilitydrive_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitydrive_copyno sensitive capabilitydrive_deleteno sensitive capabilitydrive_empty_trashno sensitive capabilitydrive_infono sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
drive_invitation_acceptno sensitive capabilitydrive_invitation_rejectno sensitive capabilitydrive_listno sensitive capabilitydrive_list_invitationsno sensitive capabilitydrive_list_trashno sensitive capabilitydrive_mkdirno sensitive capabilitydrive_moveno sensitive capabilitydrive_renameno sensitive capabilitydrive_restoreno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_inviteno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_leaveno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_remove_allno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_remove_urlno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_revokeno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_set_urlno sensitive capabilitydrive_share_statusno sensitive capabilitydrive_trashno sensitive capabilitydrive_uploadno sensitive capabilitydrive_versionno sensitive capabilityphotos_add_to_albumno sensitive capabilityphotos_create_albumno sensitive capabilityphotos_delete_albumno sensitive capabilityphotos_list_album_photosno sensitive capabilityphotos_list_albumsno sensitive capabilityphotos_list_timelineno sensitive capabilityphotos_remove_from_albumno sensitive capabilityphotos_update_albumno sensitive capabilityphotos_uploadno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.35 latest |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.32 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.0.29 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v1.0.28 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v1.0.27 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v1.0.26 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v1.0.25 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v1.0.23 |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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