Projectmind (Nik0lay1) MCP Server
projectmind-mcp
PyPI
v0.11.0
Published by nik0lay1 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Give your AI coding assistant a brain: persistent memory, hybrid code search, AI-authored annotations, and an AST symbol graph — 100% local MCP server, no API keys.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_server.py:3410`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_stdio.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_stdio.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt server process = subprocess.Popen( [python_path, "mcp_server.py"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_stdio.py
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
read_memoryingests untrusted inputanalyze_change_impactno sensitive capabilityanalyze_code_complexityno sensitive capabilityanalyze_code_qualityno sensitive capabilityanalyze_project_structureno sensitive capabilityauto_update_memory_from_commitsno sensitive capabilitycheck_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityclear_memoryno sensitive capabilitydelete_memory_sectionno sensitive capabilitydetect_project_conventionsno sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
explore_directoryno sensitive capabilityextract_tech_stackno sensitive capabilityfind_dependency_pathno sensitive capabilityfind_symbolno sensitive capabilityfind_todosno sensitive capabilitygenerate_project_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_annotationsno sensitive capabilityget_cache_statsno sensitive capabilityget_context_briefno sensitive capabilityget_dependencies_with_depthno sensitive capabilityget_file_relationsno sensitive capabilityget_file_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_index_progressno sensitive capabilityget_index_statsno sensitive capabilityget_module_clusterno sensitive capabilityget_project_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_recent_changes_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_symbol_relationsno sensitive capabilityget_test_coverage_infono sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilityindex_changed_filesno sensitive capabilityindex_codebaseno sensitive capabilityingest_git_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_memory_versionsno sensitive capabilitylist_unannotated_filesno sensitive capabilitymaintenance_runno sensitive capabilitymaintenance_statusno sensitive capabilityproject_onboardingno sensitive capabilityprune_indexno sensitive capabilityqueryno sensitive capabilityread_memory_indexno sensitive capabilityread_memory_sectionno sensitive capabilityrestore_memory_versionno sensitive capabilitysave_annotationno sensitive capabilitysave_conventions_to_memoryno sensitive capabilitysave_memory_versionno sensitive capabilitysearch_architectureno sensitive capabilitysearch_codebaseno sensitive capabilitysearch_codebase_advancedno sensitive capabilitysearch_for_errorsno sensitive capabilitysearch_for_featureno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_with_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitysession_initno sensitive capabilityset_project_rootno sensitive capabilityupdate_memoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.9.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan projectmind-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Projectmind 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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