Profullstack MCP Server
@profullstack/mcp-server
npm
v1.5.1
Published by @profullstack — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A generic, modular server for implementing the Model Context Protocol (MCP)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Dynamic code execution in server code (mcp_modules/calculator/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/calculator/index.js:38`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: al() const result = new Function('return ' + cleanExpression)(); if (typeof result !== 'number' || !isFinite(re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/calculator/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/utils.js:245`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('util'); const execAsync = promisify
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_modules/scanner/src/service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/scanner/src/service.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { validateTarget } from './utils.js'; // Real nuclei scanner implementat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/scanner/src/service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_modules/wcag/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/wcag/index.js:199`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); result = await new Promise(resolve => { const pa11y = sp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/wcag/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_modules/wcag/src/controller.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/wcag/src/controller.js:225`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); return new Promise(resolve => { const pa11y = spawn('pa11y', ['--ver
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/wcag/src/controller.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_modules/wcag/src/service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/wcag/src/service.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { validateUrl, formatWcagResponse, sanitizeInput } from './utils.js'; /*
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/wcag/src/service.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (mcp_modules/backlinks/src/service.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`mcp_modules/backlinks/src/service.js:219`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.valueserp.com/search?${searchParams}`); if (!response.ok) { th
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/backlinks/src/service.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/core/moduleLoader.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/core/moduleLoader.js:83`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Path) : await import(moduleUrl); // Check if the module has a register function if (typeof mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/core/moduleLoader.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (mcp_modules/seo-ranking/examples/basic-usage.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`mcp_modules/seo-ranking/examples/basic-usage.js:46`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://mcp.profullstack.com/seo-ranking/check', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/seo-ranking/examples/basic-usage.js
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (mcp_modules/calculator/test/calculator.test.js)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`mcp_modules/calculator/test/calculator.test.js:30`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = new Function('return ' + cleanExpression)(); if (typeof result !== 'number' || !isFinit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_modules/calculator/test/calculator.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-server.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import fetch from 'node-fetch'; import { setTimeout } from 'timers/promises'; c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-server.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v1.4.12 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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