Preflight — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.12.1, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.12.1",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.12"
},
"target": {
"id": "preflight-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "preflight-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "preflight-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.12"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/prompts/toolRouter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/prompts/toolRouter.js:324`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/prompts/toolRouter.js"
},
"evidence": ": Understand a Specific Function (\"谁调用了X\", \"what calls X\")'); lines.push('```'); lines.push('Step 1: preflight_b",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/prompts/toolRouter.js",
"line": 324,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bundle/github.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle/github.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bundle/github.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import path from 'node:path'; import { logger",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bundle/github.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lsp/lsp-client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lsp/lsp-client.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/lsp/lsp-client.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import { createMessageConnection, Stream",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/lsp/lsp-client.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "preflight_dependency_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_deep_analyze_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_validate_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_assistant",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_cleanup_orphans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_create_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_delete_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_get_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_list_bundles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_repair_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_repo_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_get_task_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_update_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_build_call_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_query_call_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_extract_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_interface_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_lsp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_analyze_modal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_parse_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_search_modal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_search_by_tags",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"search web\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_read_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_search_and_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_build_semantic_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_semantic_search_and_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_hybrid_search_and_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_trace_upsert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_trace_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "preflight_suggest_traces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d7c2acefa67ada8facffed402a1e28dd3fa9ed7ce4320a77ed7604e43cf6c6ee",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}