Preflight (jonnyhoo) MCP Server
preflight-mcp
npm
v0.7.6
Published by jonnyhoo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that creates evidence-based preflight bundles for GitHub repositories and library docs.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/prompts/toolRouter.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/prompts/toolRouter.js:324`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : Understand a Specific Function ("谁调用了X", "what calls X")'); lines.push('```'); lines.push('Step 1: preflight_b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/prompts/toolRouter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bundle/github.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle/github.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import path from 'node:path'; import { logger
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle/github.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lsp/lsp-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lsp/lsp-client.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import { createMessageConnection, Stream
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lsp/lsp-client.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
preflight_read_filereads sensitive datapreflight_read_filesreads sensitive datapreflight_search_by_tagsingests untrusted inputpreflight_analyze_modalno sensitive capabilitypreflight_assistantno sensitive capabilitypreflight_build_call_graphno sensitive capabilitypreflight_build_semantic_indexno sensitive capabilitypreflight_cleanup_orphansno sensitive capabilitypreflight_create_bundleno sensitive capabilitypreflight_deep_analyze_bundleno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
preflight_delete_bundleno sensitive capabilitypreflight_dependency_graphno sensitive capabilitypreflight_extract_codeno sensitive capabilitypreflight_get_overviewno sensitive capabilitypreflight_get_task_statusno sensitive capabilitypreflight_hybrid_search_and_readno sensitive capabilitypreflight_interface_summaryno sensitive capabilitypreflight_list_bundlesno sensitive capabilitypreflight_lspno sensitive capabilitypreflight_parse_documentno sensitive capabilitypreflight_query_call_graphno sensitive capabilitypreflight_repair_bundleno sensitive capabilitypreflight_repo_treeno sensitive capabilitypreflight_search_and_readno sensitive capabilitypreflight_search_modalno sensitive capabilitypreflight_semantic_search_and_readno sensitive capabilitypreflight_suggest_tracesno sensitive capabilitypreflight_trace_queryno sensitive capabilitypreflight_trace_upsertno sensitive capabilitypreflight_update_bundleno sensitive capabilitypreflight_validate_reportno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan preflight-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Preflight 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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