Portals — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "portals-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "portals-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "portals-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import { platform } from \"node:os\"; import { validateAccessKey } from \"./api.js\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/python-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/python-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/python-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { dirname, resolve } from \"node:path\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"nod",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/python-runner.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py:339`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py"
},
"evidence": "otes: - Default spawn (name=\"\") used when entering room or portal without spawn name - Named spawns refe",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py",
"line": 339,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py:308`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py"
},
"evidence": "te_room.py\") return subprocess.run( [\"python3\", str(validator), str(path)], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py",
"line": 308,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools.js"
},
"evidence": "ecSyncNode } from \"node:child_process\"; import { clearCredentials, loadCredentials, saveCredentials } from \"./auth-store",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ws-bridge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ws-bridge.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ws-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; // The bridge port is shared by every MCP instance on the machine. Historically",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ws-bridge.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/analytics.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/analytics.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/analytics.js"
},
"evidence": "toString(\"base64\"); fetch(\"https://api.mixpanel.com/track\", { method: \"POST\", headers: { \"Content-Ty",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/analytics.js",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/ws-bridge.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ws-bridge.js:291`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ws-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": "const raw = execSync(`netstat -ano | findstr :${bridgePort()} | findstr LISTENING`, { encoding: \"utf-8\" }).t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/ws-bridge.js",
"line": 291,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "manage_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_game",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "playtest_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finalize_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_server_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_recipes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_gameplay_capability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plan_gameplay_mechanic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_marketplace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pack_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_marketplace_facets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "place_marketplace_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_room_build_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_to_room_inventory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wire_locked_door",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claim_marketplace_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_room_data",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_room_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plan_scene_route_checkpoints",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "simulate_key_input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "simulate_trigger_zone_input",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_glb",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_room",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_room",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "duplicate_room",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_room_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_room_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_room_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_room",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_operations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "position_camera",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_video",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect_to_game",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "poll_game_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_task_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "text_to_3d_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "image_to_3d_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_3d_model_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "text_to_speech",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_sound_effect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_generated_sounds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_runtime_data",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_voices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_music",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_generated_3d_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_ai_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_generated_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_ai_texture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_generated_textures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "14acb4fe38342883ef7cd5f664997a9c6c8c519dc1a374f88bae863e3352073b",
"stats": {
"tools": 60,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}