Portals MCP Server
portals-mcp
npm
v2.0.0
Published by portals-labs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that turns AI assistants into game developers — prompt to playable 3D multiplayer browser game on Portals
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { platform } from "node:os"; import { validateAccessKey } from "./api.js"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/python-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/python-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/python-runner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py:339`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: otes: - Default spawn (name="") used when entering room or portal without spawn name - Named spawns refe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/resources/python/lib/portals_core.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py:308`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: te_room.py") return subprocess.run( ["python3", str(validator), str(path)], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/resources/python/tools/build_reactgui_feature_test_room.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecSyncNode } from "node:child_process"; import { clearCredentials, loadCredentials, saveCredentials } from "./auth-store
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ws-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ws-bridge.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; // The bridge port is shared by every MCP instance on the machine. Historically
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ws-bridge.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/analytics.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/analytics.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: toString("base64"); fetch("https://api.mixpanel.com/track", { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Ty
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analytics.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/ws-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/ws-bridge.js:291`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const raw = execSync(`netstat -ano | findstr :${bridgePort()} | findstr LISTENING`, { encoding: "utf-8" }).t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ws-bridge.js
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_room_dataingests untrusted inputget_runtime_dataingests untrusted inputadd_to_room_inventoryno sensitive capabilityanalyze_sceneno sensitive capabilityapply_buildno sensitive capabilityapply_operationsno sensitive capabilityauthenticateno sensitive capabilitychange_task_stateno sensitive capabilitycheck_3d_model_taskno sensitive capabilityclaim_marketplace_itemno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
compare_sceneno sensitive capabilityconnect_to_gameno sensitive capabilitycreate_roomno sensitive capabilitydelete_roomno sensitive capabilityduplicate_roomno sensitive capabilityfinalize_buildno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_ai_textureno sensitive capabilitygenerate_musicno sensitive capabilitygenerate_sound_effectno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_helpno sensitive capabilityget_pack_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_room_build_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilityget_user_inventoryno sensitive capabilityimage_to_3d_modelno sensitive capabilityinspect_gameno sensitive capabilityinspect_room_datano sensitive capabilitylist_generated_3d_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_generated_imagesno sensitive capabilitylist_generated_soundsno sensitive capabilitylist_generated_texturesno sensitive capabilitylist_marketplace_facetsno sensitive capabilitylist_voicesno sensitive capabilitylookupno sensitive capabilitymanage_projectno sensitive capabilityplace_marketplace_itemsno sensitive capabilityplan_gameplay_mechanicno sensitive capabilityplan_scene_route_checkpointsno sensitive capabilityplaytest_buildno sensitive capabilitypoll_game_eventsno sensitive capabilityposition_camerano sensitive capabilityquery_roomno sensitive capabilityrecord_videono sensitive capabilityrender_sceneno sensitive capabilityresolve_gameplay_capabilityno sensitive capabilitysearch_marketplaceno sensitive capabilitysearch_recipesno sensitive capabilityset_room_datano sensitive capabilityset_room_settingsno sensitive capabilitysimulate_key_inputno sensitive capabilitysimulate_trigger_zone_inputno sensitive capabilitystart_buildno sensitive capabilitytext_to_3d_modelno sensitive capabilitytext_to_speechno sensitive capabilityupdate_room_settingsno sensitive capabilityupload_glbno sensitive capabilityupload_imageno sensitive capabilitywire_locked_doorno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.3.7 |
A 91/100 | 8 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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