Pocketbase Mcp Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "pocketbase-mcp-bridge",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "pocketbase-mcp-bridge"
},
"server": {
"name": "pocketbase-mcp-bridge"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_backup → get_logs_stats ⇒ send_raw_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "download_backup → get_logs_stats → send_raw_request"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_backup_download_url",
"download_backup",
"get_collection",
"download_file",
"get_log",
"get_full_record_list",
"get_record",
"get_settings"
],
"sources": [
"get_logs_stats"
],
"sinks": [
"send_raw_request"
],
"path": [
"download_backup",
"get_logs_stats",
"send_raw_request"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "download_backup",
"to": "get_logs_stats",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "get_logs_stats",
"to": "send_raw_request",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"unlink_external_auth\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_external_auth\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_external_auth"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"unlink_external_auth\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_external_auth\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_external_auth"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_backup_download_url",
"download_backup",
"get_collection",
"download_file",
"get_log",
"get_full_record_list",
"get_record",
"get_settings"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_logs_stats"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_raw_request"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"download_backup",
"get_logs_stats",
"send_raw_request"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: download_backup → get_logs_stats ⇒ send_raw_request."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "auth_with_password",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_auth_methods",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "impersonate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_verification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_verification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_password_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_password_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_otp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_with_otp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_email_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_external_auths",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlink_external_auth",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_backups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_backup_download_url",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "download_backup",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_collections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_collection",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_collection_scaffolds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_collections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "truncate_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_crons",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_cron",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auth_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_log",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_logs_stats",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_logs\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_raw_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_full_record_list",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_record",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_first_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_settings",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_s3",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_apple_client_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_superusers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_superuser",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_superuser",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_superuser",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1738494ec5b2ae864779fdf85360c86fd01d439ca133a24865793bd82079ccb5",
"stats": {
"tools": 55,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}