Pocketbase Mcp Bridge MCP Server
pocketbase-mcp-bridge
npm
v1.0.0
Source verified
Published by nestebe — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Complete Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for PocketBase — collections, records, auth, files, logs, settings, backups, crons and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_backup → get_logs_stats ⇒ send_raw_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_backup → get_logs_stats → send_raw_request
medium Tool "unlink_external_auth" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_external_auth" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_external_auth
low Mutating tool "unlink_external_auth" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_external_auth" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_external_auth
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_backupingests untrusted inputdownload_fileingests untrusted inputget_backup_download_urlingests untrusted inputget_collectioningests untrusted inputget_full_record_listingests untrusted inputget_logingests untrusted inputget_logs_statsreads sensitive dataget_recordingests untrusted inputget_settingsingests untrusted inputsend_raw_requestnetwork egress
Show 45 more tools ↓
unlink_external_authwrites filesauth_infono sensitive capabilityauth_with_otpno sensitive capabilityauth_with_passwordno sensitive capabilitybatchno sensitive capabilityconfirm_email_changeno sensitive capabilityconfirm_password_resetno sensitive capabilityconfirm_verificationno sensitive capabilitycreate_backupno sensitive capabilitycreate_collectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_recordno sensitive capabilitycreate_superuserno sensitive capabilitydelete_backupno sensitive capabilitydelete_collectionno sensitive capabilitydelete_recordno sensitive capabilitydelete_superuserno sensitive capabilitygenerate_apple_client_secretno sensitive capabilityget_collection_scaffoldsno sensitive capabilityget_file_tokenno sensitive capabilityget_file_urlno sensitive capabilityget_first_recordno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilityimpersonateno sensitive capabilityimport_collectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_auth_methodsno sensitive capabilitylist_backupsno sensitive capabilitylist_collectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_cronsno sensitive capabilitylist_external_authsno sensitive capabilitylist_logsno sensitive capabilitylist_recordsno sensitive capabilitylist_superusersno sensitive capabilityrequest_otpno sensitive capabilityrequest_password_resetno sensitive capabilityrequest_verificationno sensitive capabilityrestore_backupno sensitive capabilityrun_cronno sensitive capabilitytest_emailno sensitive capabilitytest_s3no sensitive capabilitytruncate_collectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_collectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_recordno sensitive capabilityupdate_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_superuserno sensitive capabilityupload_backupno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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