Pmcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "pmcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "pmcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "pmcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 91,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 2.22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 0.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.12
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py:431`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py"
},
"evidence": "userconfig\": str(home / \".npmrc\"), \"npm_config_globalconfig\": str(prefix / \"etc\" / \"npmrc\"), # `fetch_re",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": ".consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py",
"line": 431,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py:163`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py"
},
"evidence": "refix brings a project ``.npmrc`` into scope -- verified: with the working directory inside a node project whose",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py",
"line": 163,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py:1140`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py"
},
"evidence": "erlay or a project ``.npmrc`` in scope changes which package npm fetches, so a call site that cannot supply them",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py",
"line": 1140,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py"
},
"evidence": "ig` lives.\"\"\" out = subprocess.run( [\"npm\", \"root\", \"-g\"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True )",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py",
"line": 267,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py:446`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.Popen( [case.command, *case.args], cwd=str(cwd),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py",
"line": 446,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/mutate.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/mutate.py:262`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".consiliency/notes/mutate.py"
},
"evidence": "ort. \"\"\" proc = subprocess.run( [PY, \"-c\", \"import pmcp.manifest.version_checker as m; print(m.__file__)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".consiliency/notes/mutate.py",
"line": 262,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py"
},
"evidence": "t[str]) -> str: p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) return p.stdout + p.stderr def definit",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/pmcp/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/cli.py:221`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/pmcp/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "MCP server processes to spawn (default: 8). \" \"Also read from PMCP_MAX_SPAWNS.\", ) parser.add_argument(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/pmcp/cli.py",
"line": 221,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } = require('child_process') const readline = require('readline') // ---------------------------------------",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py:345`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py"
},
"evidence": "try: proc = subprocess.Popen( [\"node\", str(self._helper)], stdin=subprocess.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py",
"line": 345,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py:174`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py"
},
"evidence": "'index.js'); const m = require(defsPath); const nopt = require(path.join(root, 'node_modules', 'nopt')); const label =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": ".consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py",
"line": 174,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/conftest.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/conftest.py:10`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/conftest.py"
},
"evidence": "ncestor means a project `.npmrc` -- or a `node_modules/.bin` entry, which npm runs without ever reaching the registry --",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/conftest.py",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:2431`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "ncestor means a project `.npmrc` (or a local bin) can redirect resolution, so identity refuses. These tests `chd",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/test_cli.py",
"line": 2431,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_npm_resolver.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_npm_resolver.py:350`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_npm_resolver.py"
},
"evidence": "e whole project-`.npmrc` class open for every server in the manifest (none of which sets `cwd` at all).",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "tests/test_npm_resolver.py",
"line": 350,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_auth.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_auth.py:649`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_auth.py"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "tests/test_auth.py",
"line": 649
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_cli.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_cli.py:1834`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "tests/test_cli.py",
"line": 1834
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_policy.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_policy.py:315`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_policy.py"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "tests/test_policy.py",
"line": 315
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_tools.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_tools.py:6600`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "tests/test_tools.py",
"line": 6600
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check_workflows.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check_workflows.py:390`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/check_workflows.py"
},
"evidence": "rocess[str]: return subprocess.run([\"git\", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False) def _git_checked(a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/check_workflows.py",
"line": 390,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readdir, rm, sta",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/runtime/harness.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/runtime/harness.py:119`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/runtime/harness.py"
},
"evidence": ") -> bool: result = subprocess.run( [\"curl\", \"-sf\", f\"http://127.0.0.1:{LIVE_GATEWAY_PORT}/health\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/runtime/harness.py",
"line": 119,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"pmcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "pmcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "p1_echo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.catalog_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.describe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.invoke",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.connect_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.disconnect_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.restart_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.config_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.get_startup_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.set_startup_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.request_capability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.sync_environment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.provision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.update_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.auth_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.submit_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.provision_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.list_pending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.tasks_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.tasks_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.tasks_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.tasks_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.search_registry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway.register_discovered_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "81486ad1b6a4bd9c205a74c76989465ff9aea49721e2d67f0d58ad1b6c33aa90",
"stats": {
"tools": 27,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 1,
"low": 10,
"info": 1
}
}
}