Pmcp (Consiliency) MCP Server
pmcp
PyPI
v2.7.3
Published by consiliency — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
PMCP - Progressive MCP: Minimal context bloat with on-demand tool discovery
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 2.2 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −2.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging ×4 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 7 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py:431`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: userconfig": str(home / ".npmrc"), "npm_config_globalconfig": str(prefix / "etc" / "npmrc"), # `fetch_re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py:163`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: refix brings a project ``.npmrc`` into scope -- verified: with the working directory inside a node project whose
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py:1140`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: erlay or a project ``.npmrc`` in scope changes which package npm fetches, so a call site that cannot supply them
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ig` lives.""" out = subprocess.run( ["npm", "root", "-g"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py:446`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( [case.command, *case.args], cwd=str(cwd),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/mutate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/mutate.py:262`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort. """ proc = subprocess.run( [PY, "-c", "import pmcp.manifest.version_checker as m; print(m.__file__)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .consiliency/notes/mutate.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t[str]) -> str: p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) return p.stdout + p.stderr def definit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pmcp/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/cli.py:221`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: MCP server processes to spawn (default: 8). " "Also read from PMCP_MAX_SPAWNS.", ) parser.add_argument(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pmcp/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process') const readline = require('readline') // ---------------------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py:345`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( ["node", str(self._helper)], stdin=subprocess.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py:174`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'index.js'); const m = require(defsPath); const nopt = require(path.join(root, 'node_modules', 'nopt')); const label =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/conftest.py:10`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ncestor means a project `.npmrc` -- or a `node_modules/.bin` entry, which npm runs without ever reaching the registry --
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/conftest.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:2431`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ncestor means a project `.npmrc` (or a local bin) can redirect resolution, so identity refuses. These tests `chd
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_npm_resolver.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_npm_resolver.py:350`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e whole project-`.npmrc` class open for every server in the manifest (none of which sets `cwd` at all).
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_npm_resolver.py
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_auth.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_auth.py:649`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_auth.py
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_cli.py:1834`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_policy.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_policy.py:315`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_policy.py
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_tools.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_tools.py:6600`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_tools.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check_workflows.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check_workflows.py:390`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run(["git", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False) def _git_checked(a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check_workflows.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readdir, rm, sta
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/runtime/harness.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/runtime/harness.py:119`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) -> bool: result = subprocess.run( ["curl", "-sf", f"http://127.0.0.1:{LIVE_GATEWAY_PORT}/health"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/runtime/harness.py
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
gateway.auth_connectno sensitive capabilitygateway.cancelno sensitive capabilitygateway.catalog_searchno sensitive capabilitygateway.config_statusno sensitive capabilitygateway.connect_serverno sensitive capabilitygateway.describeno sensitive capabilitygateway.disconnect_serverno sensitive capabilitygateway.get_startup_policyno sensitive capabilitygateway.healthno sensitive capabilitygateway.invokeno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
gateway.list_pendingno sensitive capabilitygateway.provisionno sensitive capabilitygateway.provision_statusno sensitive capabilitygateway.refreshno sensitive capabilitygateway.register_discovered_serverno sensitive capabilitygateway.request_capabilityno sensitive capabilitygateway.restart_serverno sensitive capabilitygateway.search_registryno sensitive capabilitygateway.set_startup_policyno sensitive capabilitygateway.submit_feedbackno sensitive capabilitygateway.sync_environmentno sensitive capabilitygateway.tasks_cancelno sensitive capabilitygateway.tasks_getno sensitive capabilitygateway.tasks_listno sensitive capabilitygateway.tasks_resultno sensitive capabilitygateway.update_serverno sensitive capabilityp1_echono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.3 latest |
A 91/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v2.7.1 |
A 91/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v2.6.0 |
A 91/100 | 21 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v2.5.2 |
A 91/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v2.3.0 |
A 91/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.2.1 |
A 91/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v2.2.0 |
A 91/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v2.1.1 |
A 91/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.0.1 |
A 91/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.0.0 |
A 91/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan pmcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Pmcp 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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