Peck — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "peck-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "peck-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "peck-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"peck_fleet_spawn\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"peck_fleet_spawn\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"spawn\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "peck_fleet_spawn"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([peck_feed, peck_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([peck_repost_tx, peck_message_tx, peck_payment_tx, peck_messages, peck_request_payment, peck_send_payment, peck_fleet_spawn]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "peck_feed → peck_repost_tx"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [peck_feed, peck_messages] → sinks [peck_repost_tx, peck_message_tx, peck_payment_tx, peck_messages, peck_request_payment, peck_send_payment, peck_fle",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"peck_feed",
"peck_messages"
],
"sinks": [
"peck_repost_tx",
"peck_message_tx",
"peck_payment_tx",
"peck_messages",
"peck_request_payment",
"peck_send_payment",
"peck_fleet_spawn"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js:1003`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js"
},
"evidence": "const r = await fetch(`https://api.whatsonchain.com/v1/bsv/${net}/address/${addr}/balance`); const b",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js",
"line": 1003,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1",
"title": "Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"peck_fleet_list\" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.",
"remediation": "Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "peck_fleet_list",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "keychain",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"peck_fleet_spawn\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"peck_fleet_spawn\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "peck_fleet_spawn"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"peck_feed",
"peck_messages"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"peck_repost_tx",
"peck_message_tx",
"peck_payment_tx",
"peck_messages",
"peck_request_payment",
"peck_send_payment",
"peck_fleet_spawn"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "peck_feed",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_post_detail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_trending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_chain_tip",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_block_at_height",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_user_posts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_recent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_follows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_friends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_unlike_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_unfollow_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_friend_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_unfriend_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_repost_tx",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_message_tx",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_profile_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_payments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_payment_tx",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
],
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_identity_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_register_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_set_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_post_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_reply_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_like_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_tag_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_follow_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_function_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_request_payment",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_send_payment",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"recipient\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_function_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_function_check_calls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_fleet_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "peck_fleet_spawn",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"spawn\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "peck_fleet_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "07a368ff9d51f1a73d9164b156bf8c70625f6a2641041348b190fa50956790c3",
"stats": {
"tools": 42,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}