Peck MCP Server
peck-mcp
npm
v0.6.1
Published by kryp2 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server giving any LLM a BRC-100 identity, an OS-keychain-resident BSV wallet, and tools for reading + writing the shared Bitcoin Schema social graph (peck.to + 50 other apps). Runs as stdio for local installs or StreamableHTTP for hosted deployments.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "peck_fleet_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "peck_fleet_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool peck_fleet_spawn
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([peck_feed, peck_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([peck_repost_tx, peck_message_tx, peck_payment_tx, peck_messages, peck_request_payment, peck_send_payment, peck_fleet_spawn]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [peck_feed, peck_messages] → sinks [peck_repost_tx, peck_message_tx, peck_payment_tx, peck_messages, peck_request_payment, peck_send_payment, peck_fle
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow peck_feed → peck_repost_tx
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js:1003`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await fetch(`https://api.whatsonchain.com/v1/bsv/${net}/address/${addr}/balance`); const b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/peck-mcp-remote.js
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "peck_fleet_list" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool peck_fleet_list · description
low Mutating tool "peck_fleet_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "peck_fleet_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool peck_fleet_spawn
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
peck_messagesingests untrusted inputnetwork egresspeck_feedingests untrusted inputpeck_fleet_spawnruns code / shellpeck_message_txnetwork egresspeck_payment_txnetwork egresspeck_repost_txnetwork egresspeck_request_paymentnetwork egresspeck_send_paymentnetwork egresspeck_appsno sensitive capabilitypeck_balanceno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
peck_block_at_heightno sensitive capabilitypeck_chain_tipno sensitive capabilitypeck_fleet_infono sensitive capabilitypeck_fleet_listno sensitive capabilitypeck_follow_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_followsno sensitive capabilitypeck_friend_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_friendsno sensitive capabilitypeck_function_callno sensitive capabilitypeck_function_check_callsno sensitive capabilitypeck_function_registerno sensitive capabilitypeck_functionsno sensitive capabilitypeck_identity_infono sensitive capabilitypeck_like_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_paymentsno sensitive capabilitypeck_post_detailno sensitive capabilitypeck_post_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_profileno sensitive capabilitypeck_profile_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_recentno sensitive capabilitypeck_register_identityno sensitive capabilitypeck_reply_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_searchno sensitive capabilitypeck_set_identityno sensitive capabilitypeck_statsno sensitive capabilitypeck_tag_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_threadno sensitive capabilitypeck_trendingno sensitive capabilitypeck_unfollow_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_unfriend_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_unlike_txno sensitive capabilitypeck_user_postsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.1 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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