Raw scan report

Parts — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "parts-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "parts-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "parts-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 93,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py"
      },
      "evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--show-toplevel\"], cwd=str(start_p",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "parts_mcp/internal/project_config.py",
        "line": 27,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/tools/cli.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/tools/cli.py:348`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "parts_mcp/tools/cli.py"
      },
      "evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( args, cwd=cwd, capture_output=Tr",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "parts_mcp/tools/cli.py",
        "line": 348,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py:391`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py"
      },
      "evidence": "proc = subprocess.run( [\"patch\", \"-p1\", \"--no-backup-if-mismatch\"],",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "parts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py",
        "line": 391,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:289`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py"
      },
      "evidence": "d)}\") result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "parts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py",
        "line": 289,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py"
      },
      "evidence": "git HEAD.\"\"\" src = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", str(REPO), \"show\", \"HEAD:parts_mcp/utils/api_client.py\"],",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "scripts/verify_attribute_guard.py",
        "line": 28,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py"
      },
      "evidence": "(\"bom\") / \"bom.csv\" subprocess.run( [\"kicad-cli\", \"sch\", \"export\", \"bom\", \"--fields\", \"Reference,Va",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "tests/unit/test_eda_export_tamarin.py",
        "line": 48,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "extract_bom_from_kicad",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "find_kicad_projects",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "match_components_to_parts",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "analyze_kicad_project",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "extract_netlist_from_project",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "open_in_kicad",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "highlight_net_traces",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "convert_kicad_version",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "convert_allegro",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "convert_pads",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "convert_geda",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "convert_protel",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "export_parts_to_kicad",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sch_erc_categorize",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sch_pin_position",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sch_check_structure",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sch_remove_wires",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "sch_libsync",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "doc_wip_new",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "doc_wip_preview",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "doc_wip_send",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "doc_wip_history",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "2b6296ac7e52074c57a6c3b8c4d83e4e0e8f32cdbfacc01deb3398d834c32bc2",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 22,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 4,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 2,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}